Showing posts with label home finance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label home finance. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 06, 2013

Oman - A sukuk shortage and housing shortage



As Islamic banks and windows enter Oman's housing finance market, they have the opportunity to use the shortage of Omani sukuk to benefit the entire market without creating too much risk for the government.  For example, with a government guarantee, the risk should be covered by the originators through fees in exchange and limits on the eligible mortgages to ensure it can be targeted specifically at the segments of the market where supply is the most lagging of demand.


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Monday, June 17, 2013

Limiting property market speculation without disadvantaging Islamic banks



Now that the Dubai property market bubble and bust is largely in the rear view mirror, there have been institutional changes to limit the prospects of a bubble from reoccurring.  These include banks increasing their review process, increased government regulation of the share of assets any bank can have exposure to and also a thus-far mooted effort to limit the maximum loan-to-value limits for real estate. 

In a recent interview, Faisal Aqil, deputy CEO of Emirates Islamic Bank said bluntly that a short-term profit tax was required in order to curb excessive speculation in the property markets.  This isn’t the first such call to use taxes to quell speculation in markets, but his position in an Islamic banks raises the question of why there hasn’t been more of a call from Islamic bankers to limit speculative activity in property markets, because they are supposed to avoid financing speculative investments like short-term ‘flipping’ of property. 

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Tuesday, May 07, 2013

Dubai courts void ijara agreement for property that was not completed on schedule



A Dubai court voided an ijara agreement on the basis that it represented not a lease, but a sale contract and the asset being sold was not completed when the developer started collecting payments.  Prior to the Dubai real estate crash, many investors signed agreements that forced them to pay rent upon the anticipated completion date of their property.  However, when the debt crisis hit and projects were mothballed, developers charged rent for uncompleted units.  The court’s ruling—although it does not create precedent—follows criticism by Dubai’s Grand Mufti in 2011 and should lead to changes in ijara contracts used in sales of new residential units.  

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Saturday, April 21, 2012

What could go wrong?

When I saw the headline "Emirates Islamic offers 100% financing for UAE homes", I thought I had traveled back in time to a bygone era (specifically 6-10 years ago in the United States).  I looked at the date on the article, April 14, 2012, and it surprised me that an Islamic bank would have stumbled upon a product that had so recently led to havoc in the conventional financial markets.  Sure, the US housing boom was fueled by other factors (securitization and re-securitization of mortgages into complex securities), but one of the reasons the problem spread into the real economy was that a fall in home prices pushed many homeowners into a position of negative equity (owing more on their homes than it was worth). 

The way that Islamic home finance works today would not insulate an Islamic bank offering this type of product from problems down the road, and since the product offered here is only for 5 years, it creates a potential refinancing risk, since most people cannot afford to pay for a house in just 5 years.  A 5 year loan requires that either refinancing will be a available five years from now, or a rise in home prices (and thus a buyer expects to sell within 5 years).   Both assume that the home will either remain the same price or increase, which the financial crisis and recession following it has demonstrated is a dangerous assumption. 

The difference between a 100% financing product and an 80% financing (e.g. 20% down payment) is that the former incentivizes greater speculation on home price rises because it doesn't require they buyer to have 'skin in the game'.  The incentive problem is made more complicated by the potential for buyers who default to be threatened with arrest. However, while this might limit the number of defaulters (in an non-optimal way), the incentive problem remains.  It is a frequent refrain that Islamic finance was spared some damage during the credit because it is different from conventional finance, but if Islamic banks start moving into the same types of products that caused problems in the financial crisis, will this hold true in the future, or are we on the road to Islamic CDOs?

Monday, April 16, 2012

Islamic mortgages: Is there anything new?

An article I read tonight raised an old question about Islamic mortgages that I think is interesting, specifically, whether they offer anything different from conventional mortgages.  The answer (both yes and no) is a bit complicated for the basic question asked. The context is the UK market, but it applies in any market and has less to do with the specific regulatory requirements for companies offering home financing.  The article describes:
Risk sharing, not profiting unjustly or unfairly, not charging excessive charges; in a residential purchase context, allowing part rent, part purchase, sharing equity upside, sharing downside property risks. These characteristics apply equally to an approved Islamic home finance plan as they do to a new conventional purchase plan designed for a housing association in the north east of England.
There are a few different themes expressed here which affect Islamic mortgage financing.  The first comes up in the first two words: "risk sharing".  This is often used as the big difference between conventional finance and Islamic finance, in many cases erroneously (disclaimer: if you reverse the two words you come up with the brand I operate under).  There is nothing in Islamic finance that requires sharing risk any more than conventional finance.  It would be perfectly acceptable for a business to structure its contracts so that they are Shari'ah-compliant and where one party accepts only minimal risk beyond the credit risk that conventional banks specialize in dealing with. For example, an Islamic bank may only offer financing using murabaha, which is the most commonly used structure for assets on Islamic banks' balance sheet .

The next part is, in my opinion, more important for what Islamic finance is designed to do: "not profiting unjustly or unfairly, not charging excessive charges".  In the modern concept of finance, this is where Islamic financial institutions should be cleaning up and taking business from conventional banks (for both Muslim and non-Muslim consumers).  However it has not happened and there have been failures of business models (e.g. Arcapita and Gulf Finance House) and institutions themselves (e.g. UM Financial) where ethical behavior has converged with the conventional industry or even dropped below the (low) industry standard. 

This is more a problem of regulation.  The Islamic investment bank models practiced in the GCC where the banks would invest and then sell on to investors at a premium with minimal disclosure (I am speaking here more of GFH where there is more evidence of the practice) would have not been allowed in more strictly regulated markets.  In the case of companies like UM Financial, which escaped regulations almost entirely, had they been subject to even minimal standards of regulation in the industries they operated, they would have been shut down far earlier than they were. 

More than any other financial sub-industry, Islamic finance should welcome regulation (both in the traditional sense and in the additional Shari'ah regulation).  There are issues with how the industry imperfectly self-regulates today (on the Shari'ah side), with egregious abuses in conflict of interest have occurred in both Chicago (Sunrise Equities) and Toronto (UM Financial) where the companies' founders were excessively connected with the heads of their respective (supposedly independent) Shari'ah boards rendering them in practice as non-independent. One hopes that other regions have better standards, but I am not encouraged by the fact that UM Financial is still listed as a member of AAOIFI. 

Regulation to prevent bad actors is necessary to maintain the credibility of the industry as a whole, especially in overly politicized environments (like the US and Canada) where any wrongdoing (or even right-doing) by an Islamic financial institution is seized upon as "evidence of a plot to impose Shari'ah". 

But I have become distracted from the main point of this post, which is to address the description of Islamic mortgages: "allowing part rent, part purchase, sharing equity upside, sharing downside property risks".  This was the point that inspired the post and I think is the most interesting about how Islamic finance works in practice: it is much easier for Islamic mortgage companies in the US to share in the upside of transactions than it is in the downside, but it almost never happens. 

Banking regulations in the US are extremely hesitant to allow a depositor to lose money and most of the potential uses of deposits for an Islamic bank would be in mortgage financing.  However, the discussion always revolves around the banking side of the equation: why do Islamic mortgage providers use Freddie Mac to provide much of the liquidity to fund Islamic mortgages?  Why don't Islamic financial institutions use more of a profit-and-loss sharing method of mortgage finance?

The answer may not necessarily be the financial institutions' fault (they do have to fit within the US' financial regulations, but there are many forms they could take to serve the market if profit-and-loss sharing were demanded).  It may be that most potential customers demand a Shari'ah-compliant product that leaves them with the upside.  Given the evidence of the industry's roughly 40 year history, it appears that when presented with the costs and benefits most consumers prefer to keep the upside, and use more debt-based financing models for home finance. 

The present form for Islamic finance is, of course, not where it will be in 10 or 20 years and it will (should) change substantially over that time period, but the key for that change in the mortgage market will be consumers themselves giving up their monopoly on the upside gain.  Are financial consumers willing to give up a portion of the appreciation of their house's value to be able to pass along some of the loss if home prices fall, especially when Islamic mortgage companies are offering non-recourse Shari'ah-compliant loans?  I am not sure of the answer today.