An executive director at Bahrain's central bank, Khalid Hamad, made a surprising statement recently: "The moment it [use of IFSB standards] becomes mandatory then it will serve the purpose better". Currently Islamic financial institutions that are members of the IFSB will ensure they remain in compliance with the prudential and guiding principles to support stability in the Islamic financial industry.
Perhaps the most surprising thing about this support for making IFSB standards mandatory was its source. AAOIFI, another standards setting body focusing on accounting and auditing, is based in Bahrain while IFSB is based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. As a result, GCC central bankers and regulators--particularly within Bahrain--have typically lent their support for AAOIFI standards, although in many cases, there has been a resistance to making the standards mandatory across borders (several countries' regulators require compliance with AAOIFI standards, but others do not).
The endorsement of IFSB standards by an executive director at Bahrain's central bank represents a shift and may mark the failure by AAOIFI to broaden its mandate beyond accounting and auditing standards (primarily adopting the international standards for Islamic financial institutions). Several years ago, AAOIFI was considering expanding its role to include investigating breaches of Shari'ah-compliance by member institutions, but the effort appears to have fizzled out.
On another front, IFSB has been much more savvy about the visibility of its standards. Whereas AAOIFI releases standards in hard copy form only (to generate the organization revenue), IFSB standards are available online, something which is exceedingly important in order to provide transparency for the general public. AAOIFI's business model and historical focus in accounting and auditing standards has hampered its ability to shift into new areas, which may explain the decision by an executive director at Bahrain's central bank to support making IFSB mandatory.
Perhaps the new acceptance of IFSB over AAOIFI will push the latter to make changes to how it works, in particular, releasing its standards more widely. It is all well and good to have standards for Islamic financial institutions and very few people are likely to be interested in sitting down and reading multi-volume books about the intricacies about accounting treatment of ijara. But in other areas--particularly Shari'ah standards--the general public and other people who are interested by don't own the dead tree version of the standards should be able to read the standards. It will promote greater understanding of how the industry works. IFSB realizes this and it appears to have given them a leg up in growth looking towards the future.
Showing posts with label Shari'ah standards. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shari'ah standards. Show all posts
Thursday, January 31, 2013
Wednesday, December 05, 2012
Are bank mudaraba financing contracts more or less aggresively structured than sukuk?
I was reading a paper by Mehmet Asutay on the difference between how Islamic finacne diverges from the original conception of the "Islamic moral economy" and I was struck by something which I have not spent much time thinking about. A lot of the focus with Islamic banks is on why they are using murabaha and ijara rather than mudaraba and musharaka, and within the sukuk markets there has been some controversy about whether mudaraba sukuk are structured in a way that is or is not Shari'ah-compliant.
As a result, there has been a lot of attention paid to the structure of mudaraba sukuk, and relatively little paid to the particular structures used by Islamic banks when they make mudaraba investments (in long-term assets). Why is this? For the most part, it is due to convenience. Sukuk offering documents are publicly available when the sukuk are listed while bank financing documents are private documents between the bank and the customer.
However, it would be likely that in most countries (perhaps excepting those with separate Islamic banking regulations, but not necessarily), the regulatory rules around banks offering mudaraba would be more strict than similar rules around sukuk. The reason being that Islamic banks, like other banks, are regulated to avoid failures, and the main risk is that their assets decline in value (or even are perceived as having declined in value, triggering a run).
As such, the use of mudaraba would be scrutinized by regulators to assess their probability of generating a loss for the bank, which would deplete its capital. Since the bank (as rabb al-mal) would in a traditional mudaraba be responsible for bearing the losses itself, and it would be more of an equity than a debt investment, there would be more pressure, other things equal, for the bank to push the boundaries on what is permissible while still remaining Shari'ah-compliant in order to reassure regulators and to limit the capital charge on the mudaraba assets it holds on its balance sheet than would a sukuk issuer.
I cannot really say much more about what actually goes on in practice, because as I mentioned the mudaraba contracts are conducted on a private basis. However, given the tendency of banks to be more financially risk-averse than the overall investment market (since by their nature, banks are leveraged and rely on short-term financing in the form of current accounts from depositors), it would be interesting to see a study of bank mudaraba contracts done by Shari'ah scholars independent of the banks being analyzed that looks at the degree to which the products are structured to replicate bank loans, or the degree to which they maintain the traditional profit and loss sharing structure that is typically associated with mudaraba contracts.
As a result, there has been a lot of attention paid to the structure of mudaraba sukuk, and relatively little paid to the particular structures used by Islamic banks when they make mudaraba investments (in long-term assets). Why is this? For the most part, it is due to convenience. Sukuk offering documents are publicly available when the sukuk are listed while bank financing documents are private documents between the bank and the customer.
However, it would be likely that in most countries (perhaps excepting those with separate Islamic banking regulations, but not necessarily), the regulatory rules around banks offering mudaraba would be more strict than similar rules around sukuk. The reason being that Islamic banks, like other banks, are regulated to avoid failures, and the main risk is that their assets decline in value (or even are perceived as having declined in value, triggering a run).
As such, the use of mudaraba would be scrutinized by regulators to assess their probability of generating a loss for the bank, which would deplete its capital. Since the bank (as rabb al-mal) would in a traditional mudaraba be responsible for bearing the losses itself, and it would be more of an equity than a debt investment, there would be more pressure, other things equal, for the bank to push the boundaries on what is permissible while still remaining Shari'ah-compliant in order to reassure regulators and to limit the capital charge on the mudaraba assets it holds on its balance sheet than would a sukuk issuer.
I cannot really say much more about what actually goes on in practice, because as I mentioned the mudaraba contracts are conducted on a private basis. However, given the tendency of banks to be more financially risk-averse than the overall investment market (since by their nature, banks are leveraged and rely on short-term financing in the form of current accounts from depositors), it would be interesting to see a study of bank mudaraba contracts done by Shari'ah scholars independent of the banks being analyzed that looks at the degree to which the products are structured to replicate bank loans, or the degree to which they maintain the traditional profit and loss sharing structure that is typically associated with mudaraba contracts.
Thursday, November 29, 2012
When Dr. Zeti speaks, you should be listening
A few quotes and thoughts on Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz's speech at ISRA.
She then moves on to globalization in Islamic finance:
However, even some GCC markets have showed they are maturing as the prospect of default by Dana Gas on their $1 billion sukuk attracted some media coverage, but not the same level of concern as when Nakheel was seen at risk of defaulting on its sukuk (a key difference of course is that Dana Gas is a private company while Nakheel's first sukuk was backed by Dubai World, a quasi-sovereign entity).
The speech shifts into high gear from here, when Dr. Zeti warns that " Its resilience during the global financial crisis should not result in complacency." This is an important point and mirrors what the IFSB said in response to claims that Islamic finance was immune from financial crisis. There is a consensus now which disputes the optimistic claims that Islamic finance was not touched by the financial crisis because its structure is fundamentally different than the conventional financial industry.
It was not necessarily the complex products (CDO, CDS, etc) that ultimately led to the major bank failures, but was instead a failure in the markets of their assets, and doubts about their value, combined with the inherent leverage of the products themselves which dried the market up and took away the ability to use their assets as collateral in repo markets to meet liabilities as they came due. A dramatic fall in the value of a firm's assets, whether those are complex derivatives or equity-based products, will lead counterparties to question the solvency of any financial institution, Islamic or conventional.
This lack of confidence will spread at a speed in direct proportion to the levels of leverage employed in the balance sheet, and the degree to which the bank is subject to possible liquidity crunches either from depositors with current accounts or other counterparties providing short-term debt. The inability to access liquidity and the inability to roll over maturing short-term debt (a drying up of interbank liquidity) led to the conventional banks' failures during the financial crisis and could lead to a similar failure in the Islamic finance market as well since it was the liquidity, not the toxic assets, that were the ultimate reason for the failure.
Islamic finance remains vulnerable to a liquidity crisis because 1) there is limited inter-bank lending, 2) nearly no interbank repo, and 3) few options for the central bank to act as lender of last resort (except ad hoc means like the wakala deposits the UAE Central Bank placed with Islamic banks during the crisis). The lesson from the financial crisis is that when an asset price falls that triggers a fall in the value of your assets and questions about your solvency, the line between survival and failure is the degree to which the financial institution is leveraged (where the debt acts to magnify losses, just as it does profits) and the degree to which you rely on short-term financing (either deposits or inter-bank financing). Higher leverage and greater liquidity needs lead to a greater likelihood of failure.
Dr. Zeti then goes to highlight the linkage between Islamic finance and socially responsible investing (which I have highlighted before on this blog):
Increased liberalisation and greater foreign participation in the Islamic financial markets are reinforcing this trend and resulting in increased cross border financial flows. This is contributing to increased international financial and economic linkages between nations, particularly among emerging economies.The development of more cross-border financial flows by Islamic financial institutions is a big positive, and makes sense since Islamic finance is supposed to be focused on facilitating economic activity. The European debt crisis, which has led to significant fall-off in import demand (not to mention the continuing slow growth elsewhere in the developed countries, means that developing countries are going to have to both focus on their domestic markets and other trading partners as sources of demand for their products. If Islamic finance can provide financing for the trade flows--which should be a good fit with the products used in the Islamic finance industry, it will be beneficial. The one area where it may be difficult for Islamic finance is where floating currencies are involved, since it is more difficult to hedge against fluctuations of currencies.
These developments [the establishment of AAOIFI and the IFSB] have been particularly important to the recent intensification of the internationalisation of Islamic finance which in turn contributes towards building bridges and forging greater linkages among a wider range of economies.In this respect there is still more progress to make, since there remain concerns about the regulation of Shari'ah scholars, and no similar body to AAOIFI and IFSB to provide international Shari'ah scholar oversight, although it is being discussed. In one respect IFSB is much further along than AAOIFI in providing transparency in the regulatory standards under which Islamic financial institutions must abide, because it publishes its standards online, whereas AAOIFI does not. Dr. Zeti does not mention this explicitly, but does highlight the need for: "greater leverage on technology for the active dissemination of information at real time further facilitates the harmonisation process."
She then moves on to globalization in Islamic finance:
In the recent years, the intermediaries have also gained scale and the financial markets have gained depth and maturity.I would take issue to some degree with Dr. Zeti regarding the depth and maturity of Islamic finance markets, although from her perspective as the central bank governor in Malaysia, she does deserve a pass on this issue. The Islamic finance market in Malaysia has developed considerable depth and maturity, enough so that it is attracting attention from companies in the GCC (mostly banks), who have looked east to tap more liquid markets, even though it exposes them to currency fluctuations (some of the banks are using the Ringgit markets to avoid currency risk where they have subsidiaries operating in the local Malaysian market).
However, even some GCC markets have showed they are maturing as the prospect of default by Dana Gas on their $1 billion sukuk attracted some media coverage, but not the same level of concern as when Nakheel was seen at risk of defaulting on its sukuk (a key difference of course is that Dana Gas is a private company while Nakheel's first sukuk was backed by Dubai World, a quasi-sovereign entity).
The speech shifts into high gear from here, when Dr. Zeti warns that " Its resilience during the global financial crisis should not result in complacency." This is an important point and mirrors what the IFSB said in response to claims that Islamic finance was immune from financial crisis. There is a consensus now which disputes the optimistic claims that Islamic finance was not touched by the financial crisis because its structure is fundamentally different than the conventional financial industry.
It was not necessarily the complex products (CDO, CDS, etc) that ultimately led to the major bank failures, but was instead a failure in the markets of their assets, and doubts about their value, combined with the inherent leverage of the products themselves which dried the market up and took away the ability to use their assets as collateral in repo markets to meet liabilities as they came due. A dramatic fall in the value of a firm's assets, whether those are complex derivatives or equity-based products, will lead counterparties to question the solvency of any financial institution, Islamic or conventional.
This lack of confidence will spread at a speed in direct proportion to the levels of leverage employed in the balance sheet, and the degree to which the bank is subject to possible liquidity crunches either from depositors with current accounts or other counterparties providing short-term debt. The inability to access liquidity and the inability to roll over maturing short-term debt (a drying up of interbank liquidity) led to the conventional banks' failures during the financial crisis and could lead to a similar failure in the Islamic finance market as well since it was the liquidity, not the toxic assets, that were the ultimate reason for the failure.
Islamic finance remains vulnerable to a liquidity crisis because 1) there is limited inter-bank lending, 2) nearly no interbank repo, and 3) few options for the central bank to act as lender of last resort (except ad hoc means like the wakala deposits the UAE Central Bank placed with Islamic banks during the crisis). The lesson from the financial crisis is that when an asset price falls that triggers a fall in the value of your assets and questions about your solvency, the line between survival and failure is the degree to which the financial institution is leveraged (where the debt acts to magnify losses, just as it does profits) and the degree to which you rely on short-term financing (either deposits or inter-bank financing). Higher leverage and greater liquidity needs lead to a greater likelihood of failure.
Dr. Zeti then goes to highlight the linkage between Islamic finance and socially responsible investing (which I have highlighted before on this blog):
First is the need to highlight with greater clarity the value proposition of Islamic finance so as to ensure that it remains a form of financial intermediation that serves the real economy and that it will continue to be a benefit to society. This requires the development of financial products and services that manifests the value propositions of Islamic finance, and that such products are marketed with simplicity so as to facilitate a greater understanding of the main benefits of the products. In relation to this, Islamic finance presents significant appeal to the growing Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), sustainable investments and ethical finance. This is particularly relevant in the context of the recent global financial crisis. It [the financial crisis] has brought to the forefront the need for the financial system to be linked to the economy and for the need for greater and improved levels of transparency, fairness, ethics and social responsibility in modern finance.Then she moves on to another favorite topic of mine, Islamic microfinance and a focus on making Islamic finance inclusive:
Beyond financial returns, SRI also accords primary consideration to the impact on economic activity and on the broader society, thereby incorporating the important dimensions of environmental sustainability, social responsibility and governance. This is in close parallel with the inherent principles of Islamic finance, in which financial transactions must be underpinned by real economic activities, and its operations are guided by the principle that money should also be used to create social good.
The second imperative is for the outreach of Islamic finance to be inclusive and to be accessible to all, particularly the lower income groups and small businesses. An important agenda in the global economy is to achieve a more balanced growth with reduced income disparities. Financial services has a tremendous role in contributing towards a more equitable economic growth and a more sustainable development. In relation to this, Islamic financial institutions need to strive to enhance the access of their financial services to all segments of society. This imperative translates into the need and demand for more Islamic microfinancial products. In emerging as a new market niche, Islamic microfinance would meet the differentiated demands of low income communities and provide support to entrepreneurial activities. Its strong value proposition reinforced by financial inclusion would result in significant potential to uplift the economic performance and development. Furthermore, Islamic microfinance, if supported by microtakaful, has the potential to provide a more comprehensive, sustainable and accessible financing and protection solution for the lower income groups and small businesses.I have said it before and I will say it again, Dr. Zeti's speeches are almost always required reading and she has a knack for making important points rather than repeating the same platitudes that are too frequently repeated. This should be commended, and also serve as a reminder that when Dr. Zeti speaks, you should be listening.
Tuesday, October 23, 2012
On balance, arbitration including Shari'ah experts is positive for Islamic finance
The Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (LKRCA) announced new rules for arbitration that would allow for the arbitration panel to "outsource Shariah issues to a specialist council or expert agreed by the parties". This is an important move for Islamic finance because it will provide a process for dispute resolution that incorporates a process for deciding differences of opinion between parties on the Shari'ah-compliance of contractual arrangements.
There will also be a significant ability to enforce arbitration decisions as well since, as the director of KLRCA Sundra Rajoo described in an article (pdf), "Awards under the i-arbitration rules will be enforceable in the 146 countries that are signatories to the New York Convention." These countries include most of the countries with significant Islamic finance industry presence, including all 6 GCC countries.
In the past, Islamic finance contracts have been subject to either English or New York law, which has little room to incorporate disputes about Shari'ah-compliance. One of the most widely cited cases was one between Shamil Bank of Bahrain and Beximo Pharmaceuticals, which received financing through a murabaha that included language that "Subject to the principles of the Glorious Shariah, this Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England."
The English courts declined to decide on the Shari'ah-compliance of the transaction saying that only one law could be selected, and that Shari'ah was "merely intended to reflect the Islamic religious principles according to which the Bank held itself out as doing business[, and] not a system of law designed to trump the application of English law as the governing law." (see a description here as a PDF).
In another case between The Investment Dar and Blom Bank, TID claimed that it was not obligated to repay a wakala facility because the contract was not Shari'ah-compliant (here was my summary). The courts again declined to hear arguments about whether the contract was void because of Shari'ah-compliance concerns (TID was at the time in financial distress), and the Investment Dar's Shari'ah board, which had approved the transaction when it was signed requested that TID stop pursuing its claims that the transaction was not Shari'ah-compliant.
In July, I was predicting that it might be a long time for something like the KLCRA arbitration to develop the credibility needed to see much movement away from using English or New York law, and there remain some hurdles to be overcome before Islamic finance companies will adopt binding arbitration through the KLCRA rather than litigation in English and New York courts.
Besides the difficulty of convincing large banks with Islamic windows that they will preserve their rights equally through an arbitration proceeding, I think there will be resistance within the banks based in regions like the GCC to using the KLRCA. The biggest source of resistance will be the choice of what Shari'ah boards to use to decide on the Shari'ah-compliance of products. The article linked above as a pdf describes:
For example, what would happen if a GCC-based Islamic bank with a Malaysian subsidiary was taken to arbitration by a counterparty in Malaysia, and the arbitration panel found that the GCC-based bank had to pay compensation to the counterparty that the GCC-based Shari'ah board said would fall afoul of Shari'ah. It would not be possible (as it would be if the two parties were in reverse position in the arbitration) for the GCC-based bank to purify the settlement by donating the proceeds to charity since in this case it is being required to make a payment. Likely it would be regarded as a de minimis item and allowed as a one-off occurrence.
But, if that happened, the Shari'ah board and boards of other Islamic financial institutions outside of Malaysia might make a push to require that future arbitration clauses specify that the Shari'ah board not be the BNM Shari'ah board, which would require additional arbitration centers in different regions. This could limit the adoption of the KLRCA standards from then on. It is likely that this will be the end result regardless, and the development of the KLRCA as an arbitration center will hasten this process, so it might be a good long-term development even if it could cause angst in the short-run.
The development of an arbitration process for Islamic finance is on balance good, in my opinion, for the industry's long-term development and it is not surprising that it originates in Malaysia, where there is a national Shari'ah board. In order for other arbitration panels to develop, I think there will have to be some standardization of Shari'ah opinion, whether on a national or regional basis.
The one concern that could arise is that arbitration (which would include an ex post review of the Shari'ah-compliance of a transaction) could lead to "Shari'ah risk". Generally speaking, Shari'ah risk is the risk that a transaction that is approved by a Shari'ah board today could be ruled later as non-Shari'ah-compliant. With the exception of the unsuccessful challenges by Beximo and The Investment Dar, there has been a general trend that a transaction that was approved by the Shari'ah board will not be challenged later on Shari'ah-compliance grounds. Incorporating Shari'ah review into arbitration processes would change that and increase Shari'ah risk, which could slow the growth of Islamic finance, or increase costs.
There will also be a significant ability to enforce arbitration decisions as well since, as the director of KLRCA Sundra Rajoo described in an article (pdf), "Awards under the i-arbitration rules will be enforceable in the 146 countries that are signatories to the New York Convention." These countries include most of the countries with significant Islamic finance industry presence, including all 6 GCC countries.
In the past, Islamic finance contracts have been subject to either English or New York law, which has little room to incorporate disputes about Shari'ah-compliance. One of the most widely cited cases was one between Shamil Bank of Bahrain and Beximo Pharmaceuticals, which received financing through a murabaha that included language that "Subject to the principles of the Glorious Shariah, this Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England."
The English courts declined to decide on the Shari'ah-compliance of the transaction saying that only one law could be selected, and that Shari'ah was "merely intended to reflect the Islamic religious principles according to which the Bank held itself out as doing business[, and] not a system of law designed to trump the application of English law as the governing law." (see a description here as a PDF).
In another case between The Investment Dar and Blom Bank, TID claimed that it was not obligated to repay a wakala facility because the contract was not Shari'ah-compliant (here was my summary). The courts again declined to hear arguments about whether the contract was void because of Shari'ah-compliance concerns (TID was at the time in financial distress), and the Investment Dar's Shari'ah board, which had approved the transaction when it was signed requested that TID stop pursuing its claims that the transaction was not Shari'ah-compliant.
In July, I was predicting that it might be a long time for something like the KLCRA arbitration to develop the credibility needed to see much movement away from using English or New York law, and there remain some hurdles to be overcome before Islamic finance companies will adopt binding arbitration through the KLCRA rather than litigation in English and New York courts.
Besides the difficulty of convincing large banks with Islamic windows that they will preserve their rights equally through an arbitration proceeding, I think there will be resistance within the banks based in regions like the GCC to using the KLRCA. The biggest source of resistance will be the choice of what Shari'ah boards to use to decide on the Shari'ah-compliance of products. The article linked above as a pdf describes:
"Parties who adopt the i-arbitration rules can opt for one of the two Malaysian councils, as named by the KLRCA – either the council of Bank Negara Malaysia, established by the Central Bank Act 2009 or the council established by the Securities Commission under the Securities Commission Act 1993."The composition of the Bank Negara Shari'ah Board is overwhelmingly composed of Malaysian Shari'ah scholars, and while several of them are widely regarded and work globally, there is likely to be concern that the BNM Shari'ah Board will adopt Shari'ah standards used in Malaysia which are not all accepted by GCC-based Shari'ah scholars.
For example, what would happen if a GCC-based Islamic bank with a Malaysian subsidiary was taken to arbitration by a counterparty in Malaysia, and the arbitration panel found that the GCC-based bank had to pay compensation to the counterparty that the GCC-based Shari'ah board said would fall afoul of Shari'ah. It would not be possible (as it would be if the two parties were in reverse position in the arbitration) for the GCC-based bank to purify the settlement by donating the proceeds to charity since in this case it is being required to make a payment. Likely it would be regarded as a de minimis item and allowed as a one-off occurrence.
But, if that happened, the Shari'ah board and boards of other Islamic financial institutions outside of Malaysia might make a push to require that future arbitration clauses specify that the Shari'ah board not be the BNM Shari'ah board, which would require additional arbitration centers in different regions. This could limit the adoption of the KLRCA standards from then on. It is likely that this will be the end result regardless, and the development of the KLRCA as an arbitration center will hasten this process, so it might be a good long-term development even if it could cause angst in the short-run.
The development of an arbitration process for Islamic finance is on balance good, in my opinion, for the industry's long-term development and it is not surprising that it originates in Malaysia, where there is a national Shari'ah board. In order for other arbitration panels to develop, I think there will have to be some standardization of Shari'ah opinion, whether on a national or regional basis.
The one concern that could arise is that arbitration (which would include an ex post review of the Shari'ah-compliance of a transaction) could lead to "Shari'ah risk". Generally speaking, Shari'ah risk is the risk that a transaction that is approved by a Shari'ah board today could be ruled later as non-Shari'ah-compliant. With the exception of the unsuccessful challenges by Beximo and The Investment Dar, there has been a general trend that a transaction that was approved by the Shari'ah board will not be challenged later on Shari'ah-compliance grounds. Incorporating Shari'ah review into arbitration processes would change that and increase Shari'ah risk, which could slow the growth of Islamic finance, or increase costs.
Wednesday, August 15, 2012
Accreditation of Shari'ah scholars is a big step forward
A new organization in Malaysia, the Association of Shari'ah Advisors in Islamic Finance (ASAS), led by Aznan Hasan, the president of the organization and a prominent Shari'ah scholar, is developing an accreditation program including testing financial literacy. This is an important step for the industry because, while there are rules in some countries about the qualifications for Shari'ah scholars, they are not consistent internationally, and there is not currently a way for scholars to demonstrate their qualifications in finance.
Many and probably most Shari'ah scholars are competent in both Shari'ah and finance, but most of the emphasis is placed on the former and scholars formal training in Shari'ah as well as their training with other more senior scholars (in the case of younger scholars) provides a good way for their qualifications to be established.
There is, however, not nearly as much rigor in formally testing Shari'ah scholars' expertise in finance, which is an equally important qualification for Islamic finance. Many products are complex and a Shari'ah scholar should not only be qualified to make a Shari'ah ruling on the formal structure of a product, but should also understand how different aspects of a product interacts to avoid the situation where a product may, in its parts be Shari'ah-compliant, but in its entirety become nothing more than a way to circumvent specific prohibitions, which could lead to questions later.
One example that I have referred to in the past was a product criticized by Sheikh Yusuf DeLorenzo (pdf) that used a total return swap to generate a return from a basket of hedge funds. There may be other examples, but I refer to this example mostly because DeLorenzo worked through in a public way his concern that the product generated non-compliant income by compliant means. In his conclusion, Sheikh DeLorenzo writes:
With this product, as with any other, there is not necessarily a clear link suggesting the scholars who approved it did so because of unfamiliarity with finance, or because of the potential conflict of interest they face with any transaction where they are being paid by the issuer to make a ruling on Shari'ah-compliance that will be considered by potential investors. But there does not need to be, there just needs to be a likely perception of either for the industry to be hurt.
The accreditation by an independent body of each scholar's financial knowledge, as well as a body that can sanction scholars if they do not mitigate the potential conflicts of interest or can be ex post be shown to have not taken due care in reviewing the transaction will increase confidence in the integrity of Islamic finance. This should not be treated lightly since finance (as conventional banks are finding out after scandals involving subprime, LIBOR, sanctions evasion, etc) depends on confidence of its customers and the markets more broadly. It is also much easier to lose than it is to regain.
An independent body, which will at first be voluntary and only cover Malaysia, should be strengthened and broadened over time to cover the entire industry and to be mandatory. It will provide a strong signal for the growth and maturation of the Islamic finance industry.
Many and probably most Shari'ah scholars are competent in both Shari'ah and finance, but most of the emphasis is placed on the former and scholars formal training in Shari'ah as well as their training with other more senior scholars (in the case of younger scholars) provides a good way for their qualifications to be established.
There is, however, not nearly as much rigor in formally testing Shari'ah scholars' expertise in finance, which is an equally important qualification for Islamic finance. Many products are complex and a Shari'ah scholar should not only be qualified to make a Shari'ah ruling on the formal structure of a product, but should also understand how different aspects of a product interacts to avoid the situation where a product may, in its parts be Shari'ah-compliant, but in its entirety become nothing more than a way to circumvent specific prohibitions, which could lead to questions later.
One example that I have referred to in the past was a product criticized by Sheikh Yusuf DeLorenzo (pdf) that used a total return swap to generate a return from a basket of hedge funds. There may be other examples, but I refer to this example mostly because DeLorenzo worked through in a public way his concern that the product generated non-compliant income by compliant means. In his conclusion, Sheikh DeLorenzo writes:
"The classical jurists have stated that whatever leads to involvement in the unlawful will either lead to the unlawful as a certainty or lead to the unlawful as a possibility. This product includes investments, even though they are entered into indirectly, that are clearly unlawful. Moreover, there is no doubt whatsoever that the transactional series leads inevitably, and repeatedly, to what is unlawful." (emphasis added)
With this product, as with any other, there is not necessarily a clear link suggesting the scholars who approved it did so because of unfamiliarity with finance, or because of the potential conflict of interest they face with any transaction where they are being paid by the issuer to make a ruling on Shari'ah-compliance that will be considered by potential investors. But there does not need to be, there just needs to be a likely perception of either for the industry to be hurt.
The accreditation by an independent body of each scholar's financial knowledge, as well as a body that can sanction scholars if they do not mitigate the potential conflicts of interest or can be ex post be shown to have not taken due care in reviewing the transaction will increase confidence in the integrity of Islamic finance. This should not be treated lightly since finance (as conventional banks are finding out after scandals involving subprime, LIBOR, sanctions evasion, etc) depends on confidence of its customers and the markets more broadly. It is also much easier to lose than it is to regain.
An independent body, which will at first be voluntary and only cover Malaysia, should be strengthened and broadened over time to cover the entire industry and to be mandatory. It will provide a strong signal for the growth and maturation of the Islamic finance industry.
Monday, July 09, 2012
ISRA executive director on Shari'ah board governance
In his regular column, Rushdi Siddiqui interviewed Dr. Mohamad Akram Laldin, the executive director of The International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), based in Malaysia, where Dr. Laldin offered a few interesting comments on the oversight of Shari'ah scholars (there's more in the interview, which I recommend reading in full).
On the Malaysian national Shari'ah board:
The national Shari'ah board does provide oversight in the types of products that can be used by Islamic financial institutions. This is probably the area where there is most disagreement regarding the move towards standardizing Islamic products versus allowing for innovation in new structures. They provide checks and balances only in whether products offered fit within their rules for what is and is not Shari'ah-compliant. They are not responsible for overseeing the conduct of the Shari'ah scholars in how they approve and review products, and to assess continuing compliance in Shari'ah audits. A few surveys of Islamic financial institutions (including in Malaysia) reveal a gap in the Shari'ah audit process where the auditors may in some cases not be well enough trained in understanding the Shari'ah rules laid down by the Shari'ah board in their fatwa, being instead more focused on auditing the financials.
On scholars' conflict of interest from sitting on multiple boards:
It is also important for there to be standards decided, made publicly available, as well as a regular review process for Shari'ah scholars, not because there is a widespread problem, but because of the ramifications if a problem occurred. The Islamic financial institution relies on the process of assessing Shari'ah-compliance of products and institutions to a large degree. If there were problems, the reputational damage would spread across the industry as consumers lost trust in the ability to rely on the fatawa stating that scholars were reviewing products and institutions for Shari'ah-compliance on an ongoing basis. Trust is a commodity that is very difficult to repair if it is damaged, and it will be far less costly to put in place ways of spotting problems in advance than it will be to clean up any problems.
On self-regulation by scholars:
As mentioned above, there should be standards for Shari'ah scholars conduct in dealing with actual or potential conflicts of interest, and in how they interact with the management of the companies who they are overseeing. Just because it would be beneficial to have a set of standards and a regular review process does not preclude these standards from being designed by the scholars themselves to ensure that their fellow scholars have sufficient knowledge of finance to dig through the massive offering documents and reams of product documentation and understand how the products work. They are also, being dependent to some degree upon the reputation of the industry as a whole, motivated to enforce any failings in meeting the standards.
On the Malaysian national Shari'ah board:
"The existence of the national board is important as it is the check-and-balance mechanism for the syariah advisory services, in the absent of any regulating body. "
The national Shari'ah board does provide oversight in the types of products that can be used by Islamic financial institutions. This is probably the area where there is most disagreement regarding the move towards standardizing Islamic products versus allowing for innovation in new structures. They provide checks and balances only in whether products offered fit within their rules for what is and is not Shari'ah-compliant. They are not responsible for overseeing the conduct of the Shari'ah scholars in how they approve and review products, and to assess continuing compliance in Shari'ah audits. A few surveys of Islamic financial institutions (including in Malaysia) reveal a gap in the Shari'ah audit process where the auditors may in some cases not be well enough trained in understanding the Shari'ah rules laid down by the Shari'ah board in their fatwa, being instead more focused on auditing the financials.
On scholars' conflict of interest from sitting on multiple boards:
"regulators, working with the industry and standard-setting bodies, must play a role to ensure the syariah (conflict of interest) risk, actual or perceived, is minimised.The lack of more organizations that set down standards for Shari'ah scholars in their professional conduct is an important gap. Shari'ah scholars may all act honestly when they are issuing their rulings to Islamic financial institutions, and may already address their conflicts of interest (actual or potential) so that it does not affect their ability to provide a fatwa that reflects only their true belief in the Shari'ah-compliance of a product. However, if there were a public instance where there were questions (for example, about whether the scholar had a pecuniary interest in an Islamic financial institution), there are no standards by which a situation could be judged.
For example a syariah scholar who sits on the syariah board of a particularly entity should not have a vested business interest in the entity in order to preserve the integrity of the scholar and avoid any conflict of interest.
Furthermore, another possible way to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of syariah governance is to have a global market-driven entity to establish syariah advisory standards for the scholars. For example, in Malaysia, we have established the Association of Shariah Advisors that will draft the standards and code of conduct for syariah advisers and eventually issue licence for those who want to practice in syariah advisory services. This body will ensure that all its members will uphold integrity in providing their syariah advisory services by abiding to a strict code of conduct and guideline."
It is also important for there to be standards decided, made publicly available, as well as a regular review process for Shari'ah scholars, not because there is a widespread problem, but because of the ramifications if a problem occurred. The Islamic financial institution relies on the process of assessing Shari'ah-compliance of products and institutions to a large degree. If there were problems, the reputational damage would spread across the industry as consumers lost trust in the ability to rely on the fatawa stating that scholars were reviewing products and institutions for Shari'ah-compliance on an ongoing basis. Trust is a commodity that is very difficult to repair if it is damaged, and it will be far less costly to put in place ways of spotting problems in advance than it will be to clean up any problems.
On self-regulation by scholars:
"Scholars, as consultants, are similar to other individuals or bodies that provide services to banks, companies and governments. To date, there is no comprehensive governance framework regulating the syariah advisory services across the globe.
Therefore, similar to other professions such as lawyers, medical practitioners, etc. It is vitally important to have a self-regulated industry syariah advisory body to preserve the industry's integrity. Although syariah advisory services are different from the dimension that is religious-driven, it should have its own code of conduct as Islam emphasises integrity in all undertakings."
As mentioned above, there should be standards for Shari'ah scholars conduct in dealing with actual or potential conflicts of interest, and in how they interact with the management of the companies who they are overseeing. Just because it would be beneficial to have a set of standards and a regular review process does not preclude these standards from being designed by the scholars themselves to ensure that their fellow scholars have sufficient knowledge of finance to dig through the massive offering documents and reams of product documentation and understand how the products work. They are also, being dependent to some degree upon the reputation of the industry as a whole, motivated to enforce any failings in meeting the standards.
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
Would national Shari'ah boards help Islamic finance?
According to Saif al-Samshi, the assistant governor for monetary policy and financial stability is that the "Despite the advanced state of the UAE in issuing Islamic sukuk, we
believe that we still need to do more [including] finding a unified body for the main fatwas (decrees) in the
Islamic financial services domain, as is the case in Malaysia".
Anyone who reads my blog with regularity over the past several years, will probably remember times where I have expressed support for national Shari'ah boards, and other times when I have questioned whether the establishment of national boards would limit the potential of the industry to innovate beyond the current state of replicating conventional products. So, to start the discussion, I will admit to not holding a consistent view on the issue because there are many different factors that would lead a national Shari'ah board to be successful or unsuccessful in providing consistency in Shari'ah rulings, with enough leeway for institutions to develop new products.
However, the question remains about whether developing a national Shari'ah board for the UAE to complement those that exist in Indonesia and Malaysia, with potentially more national Shari'ah boards popping up across the GCC, South Asia and Africa. On the once hand, national Shari'ah boards could provide clearer guidance on what the base Shari'ah standards are for individual countries, which would provide some certainty to institutions considering whether to launch cross-border services or products. But it would also risk crystallizing the status quo, and dividing the industry and limiting the ability of successful products to be adopted more widely, because they would likely have to be reviewed by the national Shari'ah board of every country, something which is unlikely to be as rapid as it could be if the Shari'ah-compliance decision were left to each institution (and its customers).
A recent article on the difficulties of introducing more arbitration proceedings in the place of court hearings to adjudicate disagreements in Islamic finance contracts leans to some regard in favor of greater centralization of Shari'ah standards. One difficulty, which the article convincingly argues could limit the use of arbitrations in Islamic finance, is that the Shari'ah standards applicable in the Islamic finance industry are determined more by individual Shari'ah boards, and not based on an industry-wide, or even country-wide set of standards. From this perspective, the establishment of national Shari'ah board could set the ground rules (on Shari'ah issues) for an arbitration panel and in cross-border deals, the contracts could specify then a certain national set of Shari'ah rules in case of disputes.
Perhaps a more specific plan for a national Shari'ah board in the UAE would give me more conviction on whether it would likely be a positive or negative development for the Islamic finance institution, because today I remain as conflicted as I was before on the issue.
Anyone who reads my blog with regularity over the past several years, will probably remember times where I have expressed support for national Shari'ah boards, and other times when I have questioned whether the establishment of national boards would limit the potential of the industry to innovate beyond the current state of replicating conventional products. So, to start the discussion, I will admit to not holding a consistent view on the issue because there are many different factors that would lead a national Shari'ah board to be successful or unsuccessful in providing consistency in Shari'ah rulings, with enough leeway for institutions to develop new products.
However, the question remains about whether developing a national Shari'ah board for the UAE to complement those that exist in Indonesia and Malaysia, with potentially more national Shari'ah boards popping up across the GCC, South Asia and Africa. On the once hand, national Shari'ah boards could provide clearer guidance on what the base Shari'ah standards are for individual countries, which would provide some certainty to institutions considering whether to launch cross-border services or products. But it would also risk crystallizing the status quo, and dividing the industry and limiting the ability of successful products to be adopted more widely, because they would likely have to be reviewed by the national Shari'ah board of every country, something which is unlikely to be as rapid as it could be if the Shari'ah-compliance decision were left to each institution (and its customers).
A recent article on the difficulties of introducing more arbitration proceedings in the place of court hearings to adjudicate disagreements in Islamic finance contracts leans to some regard in favor of greater centralization of Shari'ah standards. One difficulty, which the article convincingly argues could limit the use of arbitrations in Islamic finance, is that the Shari'ah standards applicable in the Islamic finance industry are determined more by individual Shari'ah boards, and not based on an industry-wide, or even country-wide set of standards. From this perspective, the establishment of national Shari'ah board could set the ground rules (on Shari'ah issues) for an arbitration panel and in cross-border deals, the contracts could specify then a certain national set of Shari'ah rules in case of disputes.
Perhaps a more specific plan for a national Shari'ah board in the UAE would give me more conviction on whether it would likely be a positive or negative development for the Islamic finance institution, because today I remain as conflicted as I was before on the issue.
Monday, April 30, 2012
AAOIFI needs to adapt
AAOIFI is undergoing a radical transformation under its new Secretary General since his appointment following his predecessor's, Dr. Mohamed Alchaar's departure to head the Economy and Trade ministry for the murderous Assad government in Syria. The shakeup following Dr. Alchaar's departure is a welcome move for the industry since AAOIFI is one of the top standards-setting bodies in Islamic finance. Until now, it has relied on revenues from publishing the dead-tree versions of its standards as a key revenue source.
With most regulatory bodies moving online, AAOIFI has been decidedly behind the trend in keeping its standards only available in hard-copy, even while other Islamic finance bodies (e.g. the IFSB) have provided their standards online in freely available PDF files. Reuters is reporting that AAOIFI is considering significant reforms of its policies, importantly including rules that would mitigate the potential conflicts of interest in the Shari'ah supervision process.
The conflict of interest policies that AAOIFI is considering do not necessarily implicate Shari'ah scholars in any wrongdoing. Most Shari'ah scholars are doing their best to adapt the financial structures used by Islamic banks to meet the real financial needs of Muslims who eschew conventional banks. There have been a few instances where conflict of interest has played a role in scandals in the Islamic finance industry, however, that merit greater attention.
For example, the president of Sunrise Equities, a purportedly Shari'ah compliant company in Chicago that ended up as a fraud with the company's founder fleeing the country had significant conflicts of interest with the Shari'ah board that ruled on the product being supported financially and operationally by the president of Sunrise. A little further north, UM Financial in Toronto, had a Shari'ah board whose chairman is alleged to have been in cahoots with the founder of UM, Omar Kalair in diverting home financing payments out of the company through the Shari'ah board, in transactions that were supposedly payment for Shari'ah consulting services.
Islamic finance, particularly in the West, is under a microscope for any wrongdoing. I believe that most Shari'ah scholars are doing their jobs honestly and with the best of intentions, but there are critics waiting for any slip up to proclaim the industry corrupt. The best way to counter the critics of the industry is to put in place rules that limit wrongdoing and that are fully transparent. AAOIFI is currently the best venue for this to occur because it has the widest acceptance by Islamic financial institutions. However, it must become much more transparent itself.
With most regulatory bodies moving online, AAOIFI has been decidedly behind the trend in keeping its standards only available in hard-copy, even while other Islamic finance bodies (e.g. the IFSB) have provided their standards online in freely available PDF files. Reuters is reporting that AAOIFI is considering significant reforms of its policies, importantly including rules that would mitigate the potential conflicts of interest in the Shari'ah supervision process.
The conflict of interest policies that AAOIFI is considering do not necessarily implicate Shari'ah scholars in any wrongdoing. Most Shari'ah scholars are doing their best to adapt the financial structures used by Islamic banks to meet the real financial needs of Muslims who eschew conventional banks. There have been a few instances where conflict of interest has played a role in scandals in the Islamic finance industry, however, that merit greater attention.
For example, the president of Sunrise Equities, a purportedly Shari'ah compliant company in Chicago that ended up as a fraud with the company's founder fleeing the country had significant conflicts of interest with the Shari'ah board that ruled on the product being supported financially and operationally by the president of Sunrise. A little further north, UM Financial in Toronto, had a Shari'ah board whose chairman is alleged to have been in cahoots with the founder of UM, Omar Kalair in diverting home financing payments out of the company through the Shari'ah board, in transactions that were supposedly payment for Shari'ah consulting services.
Islamic finance, particularly in the West, is under a microscope for any wrongdoing. I believe that most Shari'ah scholars are doing their jobs honestly and with the best of intentions, but there are critics waiting for any slip up to proclaim the industry corrupt. The best way to counter the critics of the industry is to put in place rules that limit wrongdoing and that are fully transparent. AAOIFI is currently the best venue for this to occur because it has the widest acceptance by Islamic financial institutions. However, it must become much more transparent itself.
Saturday, April 28, 2012
Too few sukuk!
Much of my research on Islamic finance has focused on the GCC because I think that the combination of petrodollars and a large Muslim population who opt for Islamic finance over conventional finance, the region has the potential to be center for Islamic finance in general and sukuk in particular. I still think that in the long run that will be the case, but I think it will not be the case in the near term. Instead, I think that Malaysia has the potential to see its Islamic capital markets remain the world's largest, even though it is much smaller in terms of economic size and population than the GCC.
If you look at the population and economic sizes of the GCC and Malaysia, it isn't even a question that the GCC should dominate the Islamic finance market. The GCC has 47 million people, most of whom are Muslims, while Malaysia has just under 27 million. Malaysia' GDP is $237.8 billion according to the World Bank, while the GCC GDP is $1.4 trillion. Malaysia is also reputed to have more liberal Shari'ah standards, which limits its ability to attract money from the GCC.
However, Malaysia represents the majority of sukuk issued and has a much more liquid sukuk market than the GCC. In years past it was legitimately mentioned that many of the sukuk issued in Malaysia would not pass muster by Shari'ah boards in the GCC, but this is a thing of the past with so many GCC-based financial institutions looking to Malaysia to issue sukuk. Whether or not these institutions are looking to Malaysia, they are still subject to their own Shari'ah board rulings, which would subject them to the 'tougher' Shari'ah standards that prevail in the GCC.
Add in the fact that the new issuer of global short-term sukuk, the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM), is to be based in Kuala Lumpur with Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz (governor of Bank Negara) heading it, and it becomes more clear which region is leading in facilitating sukuk issuance and secondary market activity in sukuk. In the last two newsletters, which should be posted next week (sign up on the right side of the blog), I have analyzed the shortage of sukuk with respects to the effects on pension funds and takaful providers.
One thing that surprised me about the shortage was that it was being articulated by Malaysian pension funds. Even with the domination of the sukuk markets by Malaysia, the pension funds there were finding it hard to expand their sukuk holdings because of a shortage of sukuk.
In my opinion this suggests that there remains much more demand for sukuk than there will likely be supply, even if there is $125 billion in issuance that is predicted for 2012. When pension funds and takaful providers run into shortage of sukuk, it is indicative of one of the following situations: 1) there are too few sukuk being issued overall; 2) there are too many low-quality sukuk issuers trying to tap the Islamic capital markets ; or, 3) there are too many conventional funds trying to "find a new asset class".
Explanations 2 & 3 might have held water before the financial crisis and Dubai's debt crisis, but are not the case today when most of the GCC-based sukuk issuance (and a good deal of the Malaysian issuance) is in sovereign sukuk. The quality of sukuk being issued globally is of higher quality than it has been for many years, but there is just too little of it to satisfy the demand for it. Unfortunately for lower quality issuers, there is probably not the same level of demand for lower-quality corporates (Malaysia, perhaps, being the exception).
The sukuk markets are in a bit of a quandry. The thriving market is in Malaysia, but most of the issuance from Malaysia is denominated in Ringgit, which adds currency risk compared to the GCC countries whose currencies are all linked with the dollar, which is viewed as the 'safe' currency. The GCC has the economic size to compete with (and probably outweigh) Malaysia, but has is slowed by political unrest in the region and uncertainty about the stability and predictability of the legal systems.
Will there be more dollar-denominated issuance out of Malaysia? Will the GCC focus on creating more legal predictability for sukuk backed by assets located in that region? Or will the shortage of sukuk continue and the long process of greater sukuk issuance along the lines we have seen in the past 3 years continue? As much as I would like a quick fix, I think the third option is the most likely.
If you look at the population and economic sizes of the GCC and Malaysia, it isn't even a question that the GCC should dominate the Islamic finance market. The GCC has 47 million people, most of whom are Muslims, while Malaysia has just under 27 million. Malaysia' GDP is $237.8 billion according to the World Bank, while the GCC GDP is $1.4 trillion. Malaysia is also reputed to have more liberal Shari'ah standards, which limits its ability to attract money from the GCC.
However, Malaysia represents the majority of sukuk issued and has a much more liquid sukuk market than the GCC. In years past it was legitimately mentioned that many of the sukuk issued in Malaysia would not pass muster by Shari'ah boards in the GCC, but this is a thing of the past with so many GCC-based financial institutions looking to Malaysia to issue sukuk. Whether or not these institutions are looking to Malaysia, they are still subject to their own Shari'ah board rulings, which would subject them to the 'tougher' Shari'ah standards that prevail in the GCC.
Add in the fact that the new issuer of global short-term sukuk, the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM), is to be based in Kuala Lumpur with Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz (governor of Bank Negara) heading it, and it becomes more clear which region is leading in facilitating sukuk issuance and secondary market activity in sukuk. In the last two newsletters, which should be posted next week (sign up on the right side of the blog), I have analyzed the shortage of sukuk with respects to the effects on pension funds and takaful providers.
One thing that surprised me about the shortage was that it was being articulated by Malaysian pension funds. Even with the domination of the sukuk markets by Malaysia, the pension funds there were finding it hard to expand their sukuk holdings because of a shortage of sukuk.
In my opinion this suggests that there remains much more demand for sukuk than there will likely be supply, even if there is $125 billion in issuance that is predicted for 2012. When pension funds and takaful providers run into shortage of sukuk, it is indicative of one of the following situations: 1) there are too few sukuk being issued overall; 2) there are too many low-quality sukuk issuers trying to tap the Islamic capital markets ; or, 3) there are too many conventional funds trying to "find a new asset class".
Explanations 2 & 3 might have held water before the financial crisis and Dubai's debt crisis, but are not the case today when most of the GCC-based sukuk issuance (and a good deal of the Malaysian issuance) is in sovereign sukuk. The quality of sukuk being issued globally is of higher quality than it has been for many years, but there is just too little of it to satisfy the demand for it. Unfortunately for lower quality issuers, there is probably not the same level of demand for lower-quality corporates (Malaysia, perhaps, being the exception).
The sukuk markets are in a bit of a quandry. The thriving market is in Malaysia, but most of the issuance from Malaysia is denominated in Ringgit, which adds currency risk compared to the GCC countries whose currencies are all linked with the dollar, which is viewed as the 'safe' currency. The GCC has the economic size to compete with (and probably outweigh) Malaysia, but has is slowed by political unrest in the region and uncertainty about the stability and predictability of the legal systems.
Will there be more dollar-denominated issuance out of Malaysia? Will the GCC focus on creating more legal predictability for sukuk backed by assets located in that region? Or will the shortage of sukuk continue and the long process of greater sukuk issuance along the lines we have seen in the past 3 years continue? As much as I would like a quick fix, I think the third option is the most likely.
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
Egypt as a microcosm of debate in Islamic finance
Reuters has an illuminating analysis of the questions facing the Egyptian government over how Islamic finance is regulated in the country. The analysis compares the options facing the government in Egypt in terms of how other countries regulate their Islamic financial industry. For example, the article describes the following dichotomies:
By allowing Islamic windows, Islamic finance can benefit from the entry into the market of international banks that have larger balance sheets and can bring greater resources to bear on developing new Islamic financial products. The flip side is that it may hamper development of solely Islamic banks, and may lead to the adoption of a mindset that favors developing Shari'ah-compliant of conventional products (however, solely Islamic banks may also have the same mindset due to either regulation or the reliance on management with experience in conventional banking).
These discussions are healthy and should lead to more analysis of the industry as a whole. There are enough different institutional forms in use across the globe for the costs and benefits to be weighted. There is no "right" answer--each country may find one form or another more beneficial--but the debate should be encouraged and should be backed up by rigorous analysis comparing different institutional forms.
[1] I have written a number of posts about the Qatar Central Bank directive:
- Should Islamic banks be allowed to operate Islamic windows or should they be required to open Islamic banking subsidiaries?
- Should sukuk be allowed to be issued using an asset-based structure, or should they be required to be asset-backed?
- Should Shari'ah boards be allowed to operate on an institution-by-institution basis or should there be a national Shari'ah board (or use a lighter-touch approach used in Indonesia, which may be more suitable for Egypt according to Shari'ah scholar Mohammed Daud Bakar).
By allowing Islamic windows, Islamic finance can benefit from the entry into the market of international banks that have larger balance sheets and can bring greater resources to bear on developing new Islamic financial products. The flip side is that it may hamper development of solely Islamic banks, and may lead to the adoption of a mindset that favors developing Shari'ah-compliant of conventional products (however, solely Islamic banks may also have the same mindset due to either regulation or the reliance on management with experience in conventional banking).
These discussions are healthy and should lead to more analysis of the industry as a whole. There are enough different institutional forms in use across the globe for the costs and benefits to be weighted. There is no "right" answer--each country may find one form or another more beneficial--but the debate should be encouraged and should be backed up by rigorous analysis comparing different institutional forms.
[1] I have written a number of posts about the Qatar Central Bank directive:
Tuesday, April 03, 2012
Malaysia's Security Commission-OCIS forum details shared
I was critical recently about the Malaysian Securities Commission and the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies holding a closed door forum, then issuing a press release about it with few details. Whether or not it was in response to my post, I was nonetheless happy to see a more complete discussion in the Malaysian International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC) email newsletter. I have posted it below. As I said in the post, transparency is important in Islamic finance and, while it does not have to be applied in every case (there are valid reasons for not everything to be disclosed all the time, but usually in those cases there is not a press release issued), it can benefit everyone to bring discussion on the big issues in Islamic finance into the public view.
I think there are some very interesting ideas proposed, not all of which are new, but which need to be repeated until they are addressed. In particular, I think that Neil Miller's comments on sukuk secondary markets should be a focus in liquidity management (as Ijlal Alvi mentioned when discussing the use of sukuk as collateral in tri-party repo). There are a lot of areas in the sukuk market that need development, and among the points that the summary describes from Neil Miller, the most important in my opinion is adding depth and breadth to the sukuk market (an issue I have discussed several times, including one rough estimate at the potential for sukuk issuance in the GCC if it reached the size relative to the economy as Malaysia, and if corporate issuers in the GCC became more active).
There can be little development in sukuk markets and in sukuk-backed repo transactions if there are not enough sukuk issued. In order to develop trading markets, there should also be a variety of sukuk (many different issuers, tenors, ratings, etc) to make it more worthwhile for investors to sell one type in order to buy another (to move from lower to higher quality, or from a longer to shorter maturity).
There are many thought provoking questions raised, even in the short article about the forum, but having the subjects revealed publicly should start many more discussions than the original press release will.
I think there are some very interesting ideas proposed, not all of which are new, but which need to be repeated until they are addressed. In particular, I think that Neil Miller's comments on sukuk secondary markets should be a focus in liquidity management (as Ijlal Alvi mentioned when discussing the use of sukuk as collateral in tri-party repo). There are a lot of areas in the sukuk market that need development, and among the points that the summary describes from Neil Miller, the most important in my opinion is adding depth and breadth to the sukuk market (an issue I have discussed several times, including one rough estimate at the potential for sukuk issuance in the GCC if it reached the size relative to the economy as Malaysia, and if corporate issuers in the GCC became more active).
There can be little development in sukuk markets and in sukuk-backed repo transactions if there are not enough sukuk issued. In order to develop trading markets, there should also be a variety of sukuk (many different issuers, tenors, ratings, etc) to make it more worthwhile for investors to sell one type in order to buy another (to move from lower to higher quality, or from a longer to shorter maturity).
There are many thought provoking questions raised, even in the short article about the forum, but having the subjects revealed publicly should start many more discussions than the original press release will.
Solutions for Liquidity Management in Islamic Finance The Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) and the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (OCIS) organized the 3rd SC-OCIS Roundtable which was held at the Securities Commission, Kuala Lumpur on 12-13 March 2012. The theme for this year's Roundtable was 'Solutions for Liquidity Management'.
The Roundtable had three main sessions each comprising two presentations, two respondents and Questions & Answers and a Chairman. There was also an opening session with keynote speeches and a concluding session where Chairs summed up the proceedings of each respective session and made recommendations on 'Solutions for Liquidity Management' going forward.
The session topics included 'Reaching Consensus on Sukuk Trading'; 'Developing Participatory Instruments as Liquidity Tools'; and 'Commodity Murabahah and its Variants' respectively. For the benefit of MIFC Community members and EPICENTRE readers, this Briefing highlights the main issues and conclusions that were discussed during this closed-door Roundtable.
The Session on 'Reaching Consensus on sukuk Trading' saw two robust presentations - one by Neil Miller, Global Head of Islamic Finance, KPMG, Dubai, who highlighted several constraints in sukuk trading and suggested some solutions which would help overcome some of these constraints to achieve liquid markets; and the other by Ijlal Alvi, CEO, International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), Bahrain, who proposed the use of sukuk as a form of collateral at both a domestic and cross-border level, and the development of a Three-party Islamic alternative to repurchase contracts (REPOs) based on the principle of l'aadat Al Shira'a - the lack of which is considered a major impediment in the development of an Islamic inter-bank market.
Neil Miller suggested several solutions for sukuk trading to develop further:Ijlal Alvi alluded to various AAOIFI standards which allow for the addition of extra collateral. On this basis he suggested the use of sukuk as a form of collateral. He highlighted the following considerations:
- A need for a steady supply of liquid securities with different risk profiles and maturities - in other words more depth and breadth in the market;
- The emergence of cross-border liquidity framework;
- Greater integration of Islamic financial centres to promote a vibrant secondary market;
- A regulatory environment that promotes meaningful disclosure and transparency;
- The establishment of a bespoke trading platform to facilitate the listing and subsequent trading of a wide universe of sukuk and other Shariah-compliant instruments; and
- The inclusion of built-in controls in the proposed Platform to prevent the market from misusing the trading of sukuk or controlling junk sukuk trading.
The Session on 'Developing Participatory Instruments as Liquidity Tools' comprised presentations by M Iqbal Asaria, Associate Afkar Consulting Ltd and Visiting Faculty, CASS Business School, UK and Rushdi Siddiqui, Global Head, Islamic Finance & OIC Countries, Thomson Reuters.
- Understanding the Shariah issues, for instance under the Shariah collateral must be in kept in a separate account;
- Taking security, where under the Shariah it is not possible to rehypothecate securities as practiced in conventional banking;
- Margin maintenance and accounting treatment; and
- The establishment of an International Triparty Agent which he said was essential to be developed in Islamic finance jurisdictions.
Iqbal Asaria warned against the debt-based market fundamentalism that spurred the growth of the West. Islamic finance grew within this debt based system, creating pressure for Islamic banks to replicate and mimic the conventional products. He questioned the current state of Islamic finance which is still plagued by lack of standardisation, continued use of Inah and Dayn, the growth of Tawarruq and Commodity Murabahah. There is little progress in cross-border liquidity and challenges relating to Basel III. He urged among others; Islamic finance should move towards equity oriented financing, Islamic finance should use the sukuk experience to develop and participatory instruments such as Corporate Musharakah Certificates.
Rushdi Suddiqi on the other highlighted the need for sophistication and efficiency in the commodity murabahah platform in the areas of such as news data , central counterparty clearing entity, greater use of electronic processes and the introduction of a screen-based platform for trading.
The session on 'Commodity Murabahah and its Variants' comprised presentations by Associate Professor Dr Said Bouheraoua, Chief Academic Officer and Dean, International Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) Malaysia, and from Khairul Nizam, Assistant Secretary General, Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Manama.
The conclusions were that:
- Commodity Murabahah is acceptable to manage solutions in liquidity management of an Islamic bank despite varying Shariah views;
- AAOIFI recognises Tawarruq subject to pre-conditions and that regulated Tawarruq is an alternative such as the Bursa Suq al-Sila' platform;
- It is imperative to have mutual recognition on Shariah positions amongst jurisdictions to facilitate cross-border transactions to facilitate liquidity management;
- Liquidity management is intended to preserve the 'health' of the Islamic banking system that will allow Islamic banks to serve the society/public and this is consistent with the objectives of the Shariah (Maqasid al-Shariah); and
- There should be much greater cooperation and contact between market practitioners, Shariah scholars and economists in addressing the above issues.
Thursday, March 29, 2012
A few items that slipped through the cracks
There have been a lot of articles sitting in my feed reader and I won't have time to write more in depth on the topics, but here are the links with quick summaries.
Size of Islamic finance industry
The City UK released its latest annual report on the Islamic finance industry showing the industry has $1.3 trillion in assets. I hope to have more detail on this in another post when I have time to read it.
The Malaysian Islamic finance banking industry reached 22.4% of the country's total at the end of 2011. Despite only having 15% of the outstanding USD-denominated sukuk issuance, it has one of the best developed (i.e. liquid) sukuk market, based on a lot of domestic MYR-denominated sukuk, but still showing that size isn't everything.
Shari'ah standards
A conference participant suggests that investors and advisors should do their own Shari'ah research instead of waiting on a Shari'ah board to provide a fatwa. Not much chance of happening, but interesting to see new perspectives.
Goldman Sachs
Reuters gives the latest update on the Goldman Sachs murabaha sukuk which has attracted a lot of criticism, saying that the Shari'ah advisors have signed off and the ball is in Goldman's court. I offered my perspective on the trading issue with a murabaha sukuk in an earlier post.
IIFM-ISDA
The ISDA press release is available here for the new Mubadalatul Arbaah master agreement.
Australia
The National Bank of Australia is considering a $500 million sukuk issuance, the first from the land down under, as Islamic finance begins to develop in the country.
Hong Kong
HK returns to its work on attracting Islamic finance. Despite expressing a desire to become an Islamic finance and sukuk hub, Hong Kong has not progressed far with the only issue coming from RMB500 million ($79 million) sukuk from Khazanah.
Indonesia
The Indonesian government issued its first 4 series of project-based sukuk, although only the 30 year sukuk received bids accepted by the government. Out of a 2.18 trillion rupiah ($237 million) in total bids, only 355 billion rupiah ($38 million) was accepted, all for the PBS0004 issue due 2037.
Microfinance
A microfinance product that offers a deposit product and interest-free loan program rolled into one. When will Islamic finance get behind Islamic microfinance in a big way?
Size of Islamic finance industry
The City UK released its latest annual report on the Islamic finance industry showing the industry has $1.3 trillion in assets. I hope to have more detail on this in another post when I have time to read it.
The Malaysian Islamic finance banking industry reached 22.4% of the country's total at the end of 2011. Despite only having 15% of the outstanding USD-denominated sukuk issuance, it has one of the best developed (i.e. liquid) sukuk market, based on a lot of domestic MYR-denominated sukuk, but still showing that size isn't everything.
Shari'ah standards
A conference participant suggests that investors and advisors should do their own Shari'ah research instead of waiting on a Shari'ah board to provide a fatwa. Not much chance of happening, but interesting to see new perspectives.
Goldman Sachs
Reuters gives the latest update on the Goldman Sachs murabaha sukuk which has attracted a lot of criticism, saying that the Shari'ah advisors have signed off and the ball is in Goldman's court. I offered my perspective on the trading issue with a murabaha sukuk in an earlier post.
IIFM-ISDA
The ISDA press release is available here for the new Mubadalatul Arbaah master agreement.
Australia
The National Bank of Australia is considering a $500 million sukuk issuance, the first from the land down under, as Islamic finance begins to develop in the country.
Hong Kong
HK returns to its work on attracting Islamic finance. Despite expressing a desire to become an Islamic finance and sukuk hub, Hong Kong has not progressed far with the only issue coming from RMB500 million ($79 million) sukuk from Khazanah.
Indonesia
The Indonesian government issued its first 4 series of project-based sukuk, although only the 30 year sukuk received bids accepted by the government. Out of a 2.18 trillion rupiah ($237 million) in total bids, only 355 billion rupiah ($38 million) was accepted, all for the PBS0004 issue due 2037.
Microfinance
A microfinance product that offers a deposit product and interest-free loan program rolled into one. When will Islamic finance get behind Islamic microfinance in a big way?
Friday, August 05, 2011
Indonesia developing an Islamic T-bills market
Indonesia is following the lead of Malaysia and developing an Islamic government Treasury bill market, according to an article in The Business Times (Singapore). The T-bills are denominated in Rupiah and are focused on the domestic market; Reuters reports that only 5% of the outstanding Rp 62.89 trillion ($7.4 billion) are held by foreigners.
As the liquidity management issue becomes more talked about globally with initiatives like the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation, there should not be a shift of focus away from individual countries addressing the liquidity management needs of their country's banks. In contrast, they should continue full speed ahead for two reasons.
First, the domestic banks need to balance their need for local currency-denominated short-term T-bills or similar instruments. The IILM will eventually offer local currency issues as they are demanded (read: in countries where Islamic finance has a significant foothold). However, the IILM will focus on global currency issues in USD, EUR, JPY and perhaps GBP.
However, the more important reason is that creating reliance on one product for funding needs puts the Islamic financial system at significant risk if there are political differences that freeze up the operations of the IILM. There is also the potential for Shari'ah differences to arise, although this is less likely given the similarities in interpretation between most Shari'ah scholars on the major issues. Another potential benefit from individual countries' efforts to develop their own short-term issues is that it provides many more testing grounds for different structures that could be more efficient or viewed as "more authentic" than what is likely to be a commodity murabaha-based product.
Indonesia is continuing to support the growth of Islamic banking, largely based on the model of its neighbor Malaysia, several of whose banks have invested in Indonesia. With its large Muslim population, if Indonesia becomes a growth area for Islamic finance, it could further shift the geographical center of Islamic finance eastward.
As the liquidity management issue becomes more talked about globally with initiatives like the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation, there should not be a shift of focus away from individual countries addressing the liquidity management needs of their country's banks. In contrast, they should continue full speed ahead for two reasons.
First, the domestic banks need to balance their need for local currency-denominated short-term T-bills or similar instruments. The IILM will eventually offer local currency issues as they are demanded (read: in countries where Islamic finance has a significant foothold). However, the IILM will focus on global currency issues in USD, EUR, JPY and perhaps GBP.
However, the more important reason is that creating reliance on one product for funding needs puts the Islamic financial system at significant risk if there are political differences that freeze up the operations of the IILM. There is also the potential for Shari'ah differences to arise, although this is less likely given the similarities in interpretation between most Shari'ah scholars on the major issues. Another potential benefit from individual countries' efforts to develop their own short-term issues is that it provides many more testing grounds for different structures that could be more efficient or viewed as "more authentic" than what is likely to be a commodity murabaha-based product.
Indonesia is continuing to support the growth of Islamic banking, largely based on the model of its neighbor Malaysia, several of whose banks have invested in Indonesia. With its large Muslim population, if Indonesia becomes a growth area for Islamic finance, it could further shift the geographical center of Islamic finance eastward.
Wednesday, July 06, 2011
Securtization, financial engineering and regulation
In my last post, I advocated for greater securitization in Islamic finance and I think it is a good way to expand the sukuk marketplace. However, like all other things in finance, it should come with constraints and limitations because of the global capital standards under Bassel 2 and Basel 3. However, those capital standards (applied to Islamic financial institutions by AAOIFI) still give the off-balance-sheet nature of those transactions preferential treatment and so it is especially important to make sure the Shari'ah standards can be applied to avoid Subprime (v.Islamic).
It is very clear to anyone watching the industry that it is mostly run by people with conventional financial experience a cadre of lawyers experienced in financial engineering to manipulate international capital standards to their own benefit. The industry also operates to a large degree in emerging and frontier markets whose regulators may not be as well equipped as in developed markets (an admittedly low benchmark).
In "developed" markets, financial products engineered so that regulations become ineffective and the possibility for financial engineering to make regulation ineffective in emerging and frontier markets is even greater. The only offsetting factor is Shari'ah scholars who should impose a degree of conservatism into the structuring process. However, at this point, any challenge they raise to Shari'ah standards becomes an intellectual challenge to the lawyers and financiers to "overcome" much like they undid the prudential regulations in the developed world.
As cynical as this post is becoming, this is not meant as a diatribe against the possibility for Shari'ah-compliant securitizations. It is more of a warning to watch out for the cynical manipulation of Islamic financial products to create a new "shadow banking" industry. There is no widespread use of Islamic finance to evade the capital (or other) rules (sorry, conspiratorialists).
However, there are 'bad actors' in every industry and when one is exposed as Gulf Finance House was by Reuters, we know there are many more lurking in the shadows, either having evaded detection or those that are not yet big enough to merit attention.
All this gloom and doom should not obscure the efforts of thousands of people in the Islamic finance industry who are working hard with the best of intentions to create a financial system that is Shari'ah-compliant (even if there is continual debate about what that means). It should serve, however, as a warning that not everyone in the industry has these pure motives and so regulations need to anticipate the next attempt to operate outside of bounds.
It is very clear to anyone watching the industry that it is mostly run by people with conventional financial experience a cadre of lawyers experienced in financial engineering to manipulate international capital standards to their own benefit. The industry also operates to a large degree in emerging and frontier markets whose regulators may not be as well equipped as in developed markets (an admittedly low benchmark).
In "developed" markets, financial products engineered so that regulations become ineffective and the possibility for financial engineering to make regulation ineffective in emerging and frontier markets is even greater. The only offsetting factor is Shari'ah scholars who should impose a degree of conservatism into the structuring process. However, at this point, any challenge they raise to Shari'ah standards becomes an intellectual challenge to the lawyers and financiers to "overcome" much like they undid the prudential regulations in the developed world.
As cynical as this post is becoming, this is not meant as a diatribe against the possibility for Shari'ah-compliant securitizations. It is more of a warning to watch out for the cynical manipulation of Islamic financial products to create a new "shadow banking" industry. There is no widespread use of Islamic finance to evade the capital (or other) rules (sorry, conspiratorialists).
However, there are 'bad actors' in every industry and when one is exposed as Gulf Finance House was by Reuters, we know there are many more lurking in the shadows, either having evaded detection or those that are not yet big enough to merit attention.
All this gloom and doom should not obscure the efforts of thousands of people in the Islamic finance industry who are working hard with the best of intentions to create a financial system that is Shari'ah-compliant (even if there is continual debate about what that means). It should serve, however, as a warning that not everyone in the industry has these pure motives and so regulations need to anticipate the next attempt to operate outside of bounds.
Friday, June 24, 2011
Shari'ah standardization: Inter- or Intra-regional
About a week ago, I called the idea of a GCC-wide Shari'ah board "largely unnecessary". John Foster, the Managing Editor of The Islamic Globe, a newspaper covering Islamic finance (for which I cover the Americas), offered a slightly different commentary in reaction to Dr. Hamad Hassan, the well known Shari'ah scholar, who supported the initiative. John wrote:
However, the problem becomes much more significant when cross-border products are developed. These cross-border products will be limited significantly if large regions--for example the GCC--operate with a different understanding of Shari'ah-compliance. This was in part the case in the oft-mentioned difference in Shari'ah standards between the GCC and Malaysia. Many contracts used widely in Malaysia are not permissible under the standards used in the GCC and so the Islamic finance industry in Malaysia developed with a much stronger domestic focus than the GCC. This may have been fine when Islamic finance began to grow during the 1980s and 1990s, but as Islamic finance becomes more globalized, Malaysia has begun to reduce the use of contracts which are problematic. The best known effort to bridge the gap was the sukuk ALIM, developed jointly by Cagamas, the national housing agency, and Al Rajhi Bank, the Saudi Islamic bank which is one of the largest Islamic banks in the world.
I think this is a good example of the types of Shari'ah convergence which is beneficial--not just GCC/Malaysia convergence, but globally. Institutions and their respective Shari'ah boards working together to develop products that are globally accepted. This--rather than an intra-GCC Shari'ah board--should be the focus. It can, as I suggested in my earlier post, be moved under the banner of a standards setting body like AAOIFI or the IFSB or within the Islamic Development Bank, but the inter-regional differences are likely to be greater than intra-regional differences. These differences will also pose the greatest risk to the continued globalization of Islamic finance.
Whether you believe Shari'ah standardization is a fruitful exercise or not, the focus should be on bringing in regions that are diverse, not focusing on the regions where Shari'ah standards are already mostly the same.
"No one doubts that there is a need for improved regulation and the streamlining of cross-border issuance of, for example, Sukuk. However, what the industry needs more is global standardization, not just standardization across the GCC, which is already very homogenized in its regulatory and Shari'ah regimes. The initiative - which does deserve some applause - does however run the danger of becoming a noisy sideshow, when the real challenge lies in finding a global language for Islamic finance - not creating another regional hub 300 miles away from one of the global centers for the industry. With emerging markets in Africa and Central Asia coming to the Islamic finance party, the industry needs one coherent voice - one leader - not three disparate voices calling from different directions."I am mostly in agreement with his sentiment. The idea of Shari'ah standardization--while tricky--is necessary in some areas of Islamic finance. In the retail world, it is mostly unnecessary because retail banks are focused on their customer's demand and the prevailing Shari'ah standards in the countries where their customers are located. However, even in retail banking, using an interpretation of Shari'ah-compliance that differs in significant ways from the prevailing interpretation elsewhere could hamper the ability of the bank to raise capital needed to sustain and grow its business, unless this comes exclusively from regions that use the same Shari'ah standards.
However, the problem becomes much more significant when cross-border products are developed. These cross-border products will be limited significantly if large regions--for example the GCC--operate with a different understanding of Shari'ah-compliance. This was in part the case in the oft-mentioned difference in Shari'ah standards between the GCC and Malaysia. Many contracts used widely in Malaysia are not permissible under the standards used in the GCC and so the Islamic finance industry in Malaysia developed with a much stronger domestic focus than the GCC. This may have been fine when Islamic finance began to grow during the 1980s and 1990s, but as Islamic finance becomes more globalized, Malaysia has begun to reduce the use of contracts which are problematic. The best known effort to bridge the gap was the sukuk ALIM, developed jointly by Cagamas, the national housing agency, and Al Rajhi Bank, the Saudi Islamic bank which is one of the largest Islamic banks in the world.
I think this is a good example of the types of Shari'ah convergence which is beneficial--not just GCC/Malaysia convergence, but globally. Institutions and their respective Shari'ah boards working together to develop products that are globally accepted. This--rather than an intra-GCC Shari'ah board--should be the focus. It can, as I suggested in my earlier post, be moved under the banner of a standards setting body like AAOIFI or the IFSB or within the Islamic Development Bank, but the inter-regional differences are likely to be greater than intra-regional differences. These differences will also pose the greatest risk to the continued globalization of Islamic finance.
Whether you believe Shari'ah standardization is a fruitful exercise or not, the focus should be on bringing in regions that are diverse, not focusing on the regions where Shari'ah standards are already mostly the same.
Thursday, June 16, 2011
A GCC Shari'ah council
Plans are underway to create a Shari'ah council for the GCC (a "Shari'ah council for banks" according to the Gulf News headline). I think this is largely unnecessary. There should of course still be Shari'ah standards but whether those standards are national, supranational or regional doesn't matter in the big picture.
The key to Shari'ah standards is that the people determining them are credible in the market among people who are concerned with Shari'ah-compliance. In general the Shari'ah-compliance aspect of financial products matters less than the financial outcome of the products to most investors. This does not discount the impact of Shari'ah-compliance (and the auditing function that Shari'ah scholars provide). Yet, this does not seem to be a function that requires regulatory attention (which is and should be focused on maintaining trust in the financial system and protecting investors).
There are different interpretations of what is and is not Shari'ah-compliant, although most scholars agree on most of the key points in Islamic finance. For investors, it is important to have a fatwa attached to the product and AAOIFI provides standards already on the board composition and may also provide more input on the Shari'ah standards themselves.
The national regulators are concerned with the financial activities occurring within their borders and if Islamic finance is a significant part of this mix, then the regulators can take steps to set minimum standards (whether that is through a national Shari'ah body or by setting minimum standards of qualification for Shari'ah scholars. A regional body to develop consistent standards about what is and what is not Shari'ah-compliant is unnecessary.
It would create another set of different standards in a region which is already fairly unified on what is and what is not Shari'ah-compliant. If common standards are to be beneficial, they should proceed through already established organizations like AAOIFI, which despite their poor record on making their decisions available to the general public, are already established and credible. They have become more involved with the Shari'ah standards, in addition to their primary roles setting standards of accounting and auditing.
Shari'ah-compliance should not be minimized in terms of its importance to the Islamic financial industry, however, it should not be institutionalized yet. There are still too many areas where new ideas can benefit, either by developing solutions to problems like liquidity management or by finding suitable alternatives to the oft-criticized reliance on murabaha and tawarruq. This is best left to individual institutions and their Shari'ah boards. There may be a time well down the road (the reports are that this Shari'ah board would not be operational for at least 5 years), but we are far away from that point now and there are more pressing issues to deal with now.
The key to Shari'ah standards is that the people determining them are credible in the market among people who are concerned with Shari'ah-compliance. In general the Shari'ah-compliance aspect of financial products matters less than the financial outcome of the products to most investors. This does not discount the impact of Shari'ah-compliance (and the auditing function that Shari'ah scholars provide). Yet, this does not seem to be a function that requires regulatory attention (which is and should be focused on maintaining trust in the financial system and protecting investors).
There are different interpretations of what is and is not Shari'ah-compliant, although most scholars agree on most of the key points in Islamic finance. For investors, it is important to have a fatwa attached to the product and AAOIFI provides standards already on the board composition and may also provide more input on the Shari'ah standards themselves.
The national regulators are concerned with the financial activities occurring within their borders and if Islamic finance is a significant part of this mix, then the regulators can take steps to set minimum standards (whether that is through a national Shari'ah body or by setting minimum standards of qualification for Shari'ah scholars. A regional body to develop consistent standards about what is and what is not Shari'ah-compliant is unnecessary.
It would create another set of different standards in a region which is already fairly unified on what is and what is not Shari'ah-compliant. If common standards are to be beneficial, they should proceed through already established organizations like AAOIFI, which despite their poor record on making their decisions available to the general public, are already established and credible. They have become more involved with the Shari'ah standards, in addition to their primary roles setting standards of accounting and auditing.
Shari'ah-compliance should not be minimized in terms of its importance to the Islamic financial industry, however, it should not be institutionalized yet. There are still too many areas where new ideas can benefit, either by developing solutions to problems like liquidity management or by finding suitable alternatives to the oft-criticized reliance on murabaha and tawarruq. This is best left to individual institutions and their Shari'ah boards. There may be a time well down the road (the reports are that this Shari'ah board would not be operational for at least 5 years), but we are far away from that point now and there are more pressing issues to deal with now.
Wednesday, June 01, 2011
Introducing AAOIFI to the YouTube generation
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), a standards setting body for the Islamic finance industry held its annual conference in Bahrain recently. In an article describing the conference, there was as much focus on the topics covered as the number of attendees, which did not decline from last year despite "worries by the recent unrest in the kingdom, according to AAOIFI deputy general secretary Khairul Nizam".
What has not been mentioned, but is striking for an industry body that is very influential in shaping the standards under which the Islamic finance industry operates, is the lack of availability of details of the conference discussions, beyond the list of topics covered. Even here, the topics were listed in English, but the bullet points were all in Arabic. This is understandable for a conference taking place in an Arabic-speaking country; however, it is not understandable for an organization which has influence over an industry with a global scope whose working language is English.
Even less understandable is why the standards issued by AAOIFI have not been made publicly available on the organization's website (in contrast, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), does make its standards freely downloadable on their website). The explanation I have heard for why AAOIFI does not put its standards on its website is that selling the books containing the standards is a key revenue source for the organization. This is unacceptable in a globalized world where internet access is ubiquitous and transparency is lauded.
Without making the standards publicly available except to those who purchase the hard copy, there will be far less public scrutiny and understanding about what AAOIFI standards cover and what they do not, and in particular, public discussion (even within the industry) about how they can be improved. AAOIFI was initially an accounting and auditing standards body, so most of its standards would not have been significant to those not directly involved within the industry. However, AAOIFI has expanded its remit into areas of corporate governance, codes of ethics and Shari'ah standards, which are areas of concern to people who are not Islamic finance practitioners.
For example, how is an investor in a publicly-traded Islamic bank supposed to compare different institutions based on their public reporting of governance, ethics and Shari'ah standards if they cannot look at the source document for the standards those institutions are supposed be following? The Shari'ah board is a natural (but not flawless) check for the Shari'ah standards, but in other areas there are gaps where the standards themselves are not well known and AAOIFI does not have enforcement powers over its members.
This is untenable when Islamic finance expands across borders. AAOIFI members are in many countries and the local regulators are responsible for most of the regulation, but there are global standards being developed that are not publicly available for investors in these institutions to have easy access to. The investors are likely to provide some form of supervision if the regulators fall short, which has been the case in many developed countries in finance recently. There may be some capable regulators in some emerging and frontier markets, but when there are such serious lapses in developed countries regulatory systems, it makes no sense to reduce the ability of investors to police Islamic financial institutions by making it more difficult to see the standards under which they are supposed to be operating.
It may be an uphill battle to convince AAOIFI to put its standards on its website in PDF format (they can still sell hard copies and it is likely that many Islamic financial institutions will buy them). However, it would be a start for AAOIFI to put much more detail about the recent conference on its website, whether that is the presentations made, transcripts of speeches or video of the conference in its entirety for the YouTube generation of Islamic financial market participants.
UPDATE (6/2): When contacted by email, Khairul Nizam, the Deputy Secretary General of AAOIFI said they are working on putting the slides and papers from the conference on their website and they would be up "in the next week or so".
What has not been mentioned, but is striking for an industry body that is very influential in shaping the standards under which the Islamic finance industry operates, is the lack of availability of details of the conference discussions, beyond the list of topics covered. Even here, the topics were listed in English, but the bullet points were all in Arabic. This is understandable for a conference taking place in an Arabic-speaking country; however, it is not understandable for an organization which has influence over an industry with a global scope whose working language is English.
Even less understandable is why the standards issued by AAOIFI have not been made publicly available on the organization's website (in contrast, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), does make its standards freely downloadable on their website). The explanation I have heard for why AAOIFI does not put its standards on its website is that selling the books containing the standards is a key revenue source for the organization. This is unacceptable in a globalized world where internet access is ubiquitous and transparency is lauded.
Without making the standards publicly available except to those who purchase the hard copy, there will be far less public scrutiny and understanding about what AAOIFI standards cover and what they do not, and in particular, public discussion (even within the industry) about how they can be improved. AAOIFI was initially an accounting and auditing standards body, so most of its standards would not have been significant to those not directly involved within the industry. However, AAOIFI has expanded its remit into areas of corporate governance, codes of ethics and Shari'ah standards, which are areas of concern to people who are not Islamic finance practitioners.
For example, how is an investor in a publicly-traded Islamic bank supposed to compare different institutions based on their public reporting of governance, ethics and Shari'ah standards if they cannot look at the source document for the standards those institutions are supposed be following? The Shari'ah board is a natural (but not flawless) check for the Shari'ah standards, but in other areas there are gaps where the standards themselves are not well known and AAOIFI does not have enforcement powers over its members.
This is untenable when Islamic finance expands across borders. AAOIFI members are in many countries and the local regulators are responsible for most of the regulation, but there are global standards being developed that are not publicly available for investors in these institutions to have easy access to. The investors are likely to provide some form of supervision if the regulators fall short, which has been the case in many developed countries in finance recently. There may be some capable regulators in some emerging and frontier markets, but when there are such serious lapses in developed countries regulatory systems, it makes no sense to reduce the ability of investors to police Islamic financial institutions by making it more difficult to see the standards under which they are supposed to be operating.
It may be an uphill battle to convince AAOIFI to put its standards on its website in PDF format (they can still sell hard copies and it is likely that many Islamic financial institutions will buy them). However, it would be a start for AAOIFI to put much more detail about the recent conference on its website, whether that is the presentations made, transcripts of speeches or video of the conference in its entirety for the YouTube generation of Islamic financial market participants.
UPDATE (6/2): When contacted by email, Khairul Nizam, the Deputy Secretary General of AAOIFI said they are working on putting the slides and papers from the conference on their website and they would be up "in the next week or so".
Sunday, April 24, 2011
Making Islamic financial institutions "most admired companies"
In a recent column, Rushdi Siddiqui discusses his talk at the Bold Talks 2011 and focuses on an area that is overlooked too often within Islamic finance: corporate social responsibility and environmental impact analysis of projects financed by Islamic financial institutions. He notes that "not one Islamic bank is a member of the Equator, Carbon and/or Climate Principals, yet, the GCC has one of the largest carbon footprints".
I lamented this fact a little over 2 years ago and it is somewhat disheartening to see so little (read: nothing) be done to move Islamic finance into an area where it can claim to be taking the lead on something. While there are a number of financial institutions that do pay attention to their environmental responsibility, Islamic finance could be unique if they incorporated environmental stewardship within its core values.
I cannot offer a definitive opinion either way about whether incorporating environmental responsibility into the Shari'ah standards could be an option. However, one of the ways to approach it would be to treat environmental stewardship as a form of fulfilling our responsibility to protect the source of everything we have (which we are not allowed to destroy without destroying ourselves).
The reason why this would be an important step forward is that it would allow the Islamic financial industry to say with confidence that its values are inherently different from other industries. Not only is environmental responsibility important for the financial impact it can play in the industry's growth, it is one of the core values underpinning the industry and Islamic finance does not just promote environmental conservation because it makes good PR.
Environmental considerations are not the only area where this could be incorporated into the industry, but it is probably one of the easiest to explain. Ease of explanation of why Islamic finance differs from other financial sectors is key if we are to make Islamic financial institutions into "'most admired companies' that young people want to work for". Let's hope I'm not writing the same blog post 2 years from now!
I lamented this fact a little over 2 years ago and it is somewhat disheartening to see so little (read: nothing) be done to move Islamic finance into an area where it can claim to be taking the lead on something. While there are a number of financial institutions that do pay attention to their environmental responsibility, Islamic finance could be unique if they incorporated environmental stewardship within its core values.
I cannot offer a definitive opinion either way about whether incorporating environmental responsibility into the Shari'ah standards could be an option. However, one of the ways to approach it would be to treat environmental stewardship as a form of fulfilling our responsibility to protect the source of everything we have (which we are not allowed to destroy without destroying ourselves).
The reason why this would be an important step forward is that it would allow the Islamic financial industry to say with confidence that its values are inherently different from other industries. Not only is environmental responsibility important for the financial impact it can play in the industry's growth, it is one of the core values underpinning the industry and Islamic finance does not just promote environmental conservation because it makes good PR.
Environmental considerations are not the only area where this could be incorporated into the industry, but it is probably one of the easiest to explain. Ease of explanation of why Islamic finance differs from other financial sectors is key if we are to make Islamic financial institutions into "'most admired companies' that young people want to work for". Let's hope I'm not writing the same blog post 2 years from now!
Friday, October 01, 2010
GCC sukuk markets may grow in Q4, Shari'ah scholars and standards, women in Islamic finance
One of the many themes I have tried to articulate on this blog is the areas where Islamic finance can differentiate itself from conventional finance. An article in Maktoob Business points to one area that may be difficult for Islamic finance, but should not be impossible given the low bar set by conventional finance. This is the role of women in Islamic finance. Currently, there are few women in top roles in Islamic finance although there are several exceptions in Malaysia (with the head of one Islamic bank, the central bank and one Shari'ah scholar being women). As I mentioned, there is a relatively low bar set by conventional finance: the industry is one of the more male-dominated industries across the world. As the article mentions, Islamic finance has not yet seen as much participation by women in top roles, but there is no inherent reason why this cannot be the case. Should Islamic finance be successful n becoming more balanced in terms of gender participation, it would set an example for conventional finance, but also counter popular misconceptions about women and Islam more generally.
The move by Dubai Islamic Bank to up its stake in Tamweel to 57.33% has led to rumors that Emaar, the largest shareholder of Amlak Finance, will sell its stake in the other Islamic mortgage company in Dubai, which was expected to be merged with Tamweel.
Qatar Islamic Bank has reportedly priced its five-year, $750 million sukuk at 262.5 basis points over midswaps. There has been little corporate sukuk issuance in the GCC outside of regular Bahraini Central Bank short-term issues and Saudi corporate issues. The resolution of the Dubai World debt agreement for $25 billion of debt has led to a revived pipeline that at $5.5 billion which now surpasses the pipeline in Asia of $2.1 billion. Particularly since the Dubai debt crisis, Asian issuers have been much more active in the primary market for sukuk as investors have viewed the GCC as being significantly more risky, even though most of the problems were contained to Dubai (and to a few Kuwaiti investment banks). However, the Dubai World situation is not resolved entirely and remains dynamic, which could quickly increase the risk aversion of investors towards the GCC.
The issue of ensuring proper governance with respect to Shari'ah scholars has become a widely discussed issue since ISRA proposed a global certification, which Reuters describes as having 'overwhelmed' the industry. The ISRA proposal and the issue of coordination of Shari'ah standards in general has received a cool reception from Megat Hiziani Hassan, a lawyer at Malaysian firm Zaid Ibrahim. In an opinion article in Maktoob Business, Dr. Rusni Hassan, a Shari'ah advisor to HSBC Amanah Malaysia, reminds the Islamic finance industry that Shari'ah scholars are best suited as 'guides', not 'police'. I agree in general--Shari'ah scholars should have a 'teaching' role to ensure that practitioners understand the rules around Shari'ah-compliance and the reasons for them. However, there is a role for Shari'ah scholars as 'police' as well that will prevent or at least mitigate the Shari'ah risk associated with future reversals in approval of controversial products' Shari'ah-compliance. In many ways, Shari'ah scholars are 'regulators' of the Islamic finance industry and without their setting firm boundaries, financial engineering can be taken too far in creating products that meet the letter but not the spirit of the rules governing the industry.
The move by Dubai Islamic Bank to up its stake in Tamweel to 57.33% has led to rumors that Emaar, the largest shareholder of Amlak Finance, will sell its stake in the other Islamic mortgage company in Dubai, which was expected to be merged with Tamweel.
Qatar Islamic Bank has reportedly priced its five-year, $750 million sukuk at 262.5 basis points over midswaps. There has been little corporate sukuk issuance in the GCC outside of regular Bahraini Central Bank short-term issues and Saudi corporate issues. The resolution of the Dubai World debt agreement for $25 billion of debt has led to a revived pipeline that at $5.5 billion which now surpasses the pipeline in Asia of $2.1 billion. Particularly since the Dubai debt crisis, Asian issuers have been much more active in the primary market for sukuk as investors have viewed the GCC as being significantly more risky, even though most of the problems were contained to Dubai (and to a few Kuwaiti investment banks). However, the Dubai World situation is not resolved entirely and remains dynamic, which could quickly increase the risk aversion of investors towards the GCC.
The issue of ensuring proper governance with respect to Shari'ah scholars has become a widely discussed issue since ISRA proposed a global certification, which Reuters describes as having 'overwhelmed' the industry. The ISRA proposal and the issue of coordination of Shari'ah standards in general has received a cool reception from Megat Hiziani Hassan, a lawyer at Malaysian firm Zaid Ibrahim. In an opinion article in Maktoob Business, Dr. Rusni Hassan, a Shari'ah advisor to HSBC Amanah Malaysia, reminds the Islamic finance industry that Shari'ah scholars are best suited as 'guides', not 'police'. I agree in general--Shari'ah scholars should have a 'teaching' role to ensure that practitioners understand the rules around Shari'ah-compliance and the reasons for them. However, there is a role for Shari'ah scholars as 'police' as well that will prevent or at least mitigate the Shari'ah risk associated with future reversals in approval of controversial products' Shari'ah-compliance. In many ways, Shari'ah scholars are 'regulators' of the Islamic finance industry and without their setting firm boundaries, financial engineering can be taken too far in creating products that meet the letter but not the spirit of the rules governing the industry.
Sunday, September 12, 2010
Malaysia as a primary legal jurisdiction for Islamic finance, Islamic finance news
Malaysia wants to become a hub as the country where Islamic financial contracts are governed. Currently, most Islamic finance contracts are governed by English laws, because of its predictability. While Malaysia has a unique position having a Shari'ah advisory council at its central bank and could therefore provide governmental legitimacy to the process of litigating whether certain contracts were or were not Shari'ah-compliant, it would likely run into difficulty because the country's Shafi'i interpretation of Shari'ah is viewed as more liberal than the Hanafi and Hambali interpretations used in the GCC. Therefore, it may be unlikely that an Islamic finance institution would submit to the jurisdiction where a different interpretation of Shari'ah is prevalent.
The Shari'ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia gave the go-ahead for wa'd (unilateral promise) to be used to hedge against currency fluctuations as long as there is no compensation paid for the wa'd, which would make it a bilateral wa'd. The promise is binding on the promisor.
Rusdhi Siddiqui's latest article tackles the area of Islamic finance news, which I agree does have too little depth behind it. Bloomberg articles (not to pick on them alone) give the bullet points and then re-spout market statistics with too little context. Other news outlets just string together a few quotes with generalities about "Islamic finance is designed to avoid interest, etc". If this blog does anything, I hope it provides a current and critical look at the Islamic finance industry. It certainly has an inherent bias towards the Islamic finance industry, but I have also been critical of the "party line" talking point (for a while at least) that Islamic finance was not harmed by the credit crisis. And thankfully, there are other reporters out there who take stands against things that are either ridiculous Panglossian ideas or products that too cynically avoid the restrictions that are the heart of the Islamic finance industry. However, it is always a good time to remind oneself to think critically.
Other News
The Shari'ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia gave the go-ahead for wa'd (unilateral promise) to be used to hedge against currency fluctuations as long as there is no compensation paid for the wa'd, which would make it a bilateral wa'd. The promise is binding on the promisor.
Rusdhi Siddiqui's latest article tackles the area of Islamic finance news, which I agree does have too little depth behind it. Bloomberg articles (not to pick on them alone) give the bullet points and then re-spout market statistics with too little context. Other news outlets just string together a few quotes with generalities about "Islamic finance is designed to avoid interest, etc". If this blog does anything, I hope it provides a current and critical look at the Islamic finance industry. It certainly has an inherent bias towards the Islamic finance industry, but I have also been critical of the "party line" talking point (for a while at least) that Islamic finance was not harmed by the credit crisis. And thankfully, there are other reporters out there who take stands against things that are either ridiculous Panglossian ideas or products that too cynically avoid the restrictions that are the heart of the Islamic finance industry. However, it is always a good time to remind oneself to think critically.
Other News
- Kiplinger has an interview with Monem Salam and Nicholas Kaiser of the Amana Funds.
- Details about the Dubai World restructuring are coming and I expect more to come out as the process of implementing the restructuring proceeds.
- Mushtak Parker wrote an article about the growth of Islamic ETFs.
- Pakistan's government plans to sell sukuk by the end of the month. The sukuk are expected to carry a maturity of less than on year.
- Despite many suggestions that Islamic finance could become viable in Russia, there are few Islamic financial institutions in the country.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)