Showing posts with label bankruptcy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bankruptcy. Show all posts

Sunday, February 17, 2013

The GCC embarks on the journey of developing a bankruptcy regime



The financial crisis of 2007 -2009 did not spare the GCC region or Islamic finance as many real estate-related companies, and some financial institutions with exposure to this sector, either failed or were forced to restructure their debt.  A number of these companies had Shari’ah-compliant financing that was involved.  One of the most well known is Nahkeel Development Company whose $3.52 billion sukuk led to the Dubai debt crisis.  

Kuwait Finance Centre (Markaz) released an interesting report in January 2013 (PDF) detailing how much development the GCC needs to implement bankruptcy legislation that meets international standards.  There have been some efforts—some more successful than others—like the Dubai World Tribunal (established by Decree No. 57 of 2009) and Kuwait’s Financial Stability Law which was passed in March 2009. 

The primary resolution in the GCC for corporate defaults is either liquidation of the company or a consensual restructuring of the debt obligations.  There is no established process for distressed companies to enter a court-led process that aims first for the restructuring of debts and the reorganization of the business so that it can become viable, as there is elsewhere (e.g. the Chapter 11 reorganization process in the United States).  Markaz described: “A closer look reveals that the Bankruptcy laws in GCC are primarily liquidation laws and are insufficient to help an ailing company to restructure its debt so that it can continue in business.” (emphasis in original). 
Markaz further comments that:

“There is a stigma associated with bankruptcy in the GCC, which makes filing for bankruptcy protection almost unheard of in the region. This is both due to the cultural stigma attached in addition to the inadequacy of regional bankruptcy laws where they exist.  The lacking regulation and legal framework came into focus with the financial crisis whereby many firms in the GCC encountered debt and insolvency issues with very little in the way of legal recourse for resolution.

The primary outcome of the financial crisis-related defaults by GCC corporates, including the government-related enterprises like Nakheel was that creditors were forced into some form of restructuring through an ad hoc arrangement outside of any established legal process and where an emergency legal process was imposed, it was subject to either significant uncertainties (e.g. Kuwait’s Financial Stability Law) or was limited in scope (the Dubai World Tribunal established by Decree No. 57).  It should not be surprising—nor is leveling too much criticism in hindsight particularly valuable—since many countries even where there were established bankruptcy laws resorted to one-off or otherwise unusual resolution processes for the financial sector following the financial crisis. 

However, the recent experiences do highlight many areas where improvements can be made so that future defaults can be better managed without leaving the restructuring to be done outside of an established process.  Because, while some restructuring outside of periods of financial crisis may proceed relatively smoothly (e.g. the restructuring of the $1bn Dana Gas sukuk) with minimum market disruption, it relies too much on the hope that there will not come a time when a voluntary restructuring agreement cannot be reached. 

A stopgap measure for some companies will be to use the bankruptcy law of another country, like Arcapita did with its Chapter 11 filing in the United States (PDF), which has led to a proposed reorganization plan that will allow the company to leave Chapter 11 and conduct an orderly exit from its investments with a formalized process for splitting up whatever value remains for the secured and unsecured creditors.  But, not all companies are eligible to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (which requires some assets in the US, where Arcapita had an office and many of its investments).  As an article on cross-border insolvencies by Howard Seife, a lawyer at Chadbourne & Parke LLP (PDF) explained:

“Section 109(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code permits a Chapter 11 filing in a U.S. bankruptcy court by a person (defined in Section 101(41) as including a corporation) ‘that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States.’  Cases that have considered the ‘property’ requirement with respect to foreign corporations have found it satisfied by even a minimal amount of property located in the U.S.”

For example, the Dana Gas sukuk, where assets were located in the UAE, Egypt and Iraq would probably not be able to take advantage of the Chapter 11 process if it had failed to restructure its sukuk.  It could, instead, let creditors take Dana Gas to an English court (which was the law chosen for most of the dispute resolution for the sukuk), but as the prospectus notes: “in respect of foreign court judgements, the UAE courts are unlikely to enforce an English judgment without re-examining the merits of the claim and may not observe the choice by the parties of English law as the governing law of the transaction.”

The UAE is addressing one aspect of the problem with a new bankruptcy law that was expected to be enacted by the end of 2012, but it has since been pushed back to late 2013.  A managing director at Deloitte Corporate Finance explained the purpose of the new law as “provid[ing] a method by which stressed and distressed companies can either come to a place where they are able to resume trading profitably and to the advantage of all parties, or be wound up and liquidated in a controlled manner.”

Reuters reported that the draft law is likely to be based on the French bankruptcy laws, which is debtor friendly (the US’ Chapter 11 process is also viewed as being debtor friendly). 

The development of a bankruptcy resolution process is positive, and even with a delayed development of a bankruptcy law in the UAE will help attract investors.  If it is based on the French or US bankruptcy law, as indicated, it could allow for either reorganization (where the company remains in business with a modified capital structure where, for example, some debt is converted to equity) or liquidation, depending on whether the business is seen as viable.  However, as the Markaz report highlights (specifically in the table below), there are other factors that are important besides just the reorganization laws.












Islamic finance and sukuk in particular, the first three rows in the table are of particular importance.  Many sukuk issued by GCC corporates and governments are not rated and while ratings agencies have taken significant criticism following the financial crisis for the high ratings they gave to what turned out to be low quality securities, they can still provide information to investors.  Currently there is no requirement for new sukuk to be rated (e.g. in order to be listed), whereas Malaysia requires a rating for any sukuk that are offered to the retail market.

The second and third rows are all important as well in developing the ability of sukuk holders to take possession of the underlying collateral in asset-backed sukuk.  Currently, sukuk holders can enforce on some collateral because the sukuk are based on English law (mostly), but they are limited in enforcing on collateral within the GCC region.   

If more sukuk are issued using an asset-backed structure, which is often suggested as being preferable compared with the asset-based sukuk that mimic unsecured bonds through a purchase undertaking by the issuer, there will need to be the ability of sukuk holders to take possession of the asset to sell it to recover some of their investment if a sukuk defaults.  That will probably not happen in the near-term, but in the context of thinking about the role of a bankruptcy process in the GCC, it should not be ignored either.  

In the end, there is not a well-developed process for bankruptcy in the GCC and, particularly in the wake of restructurings necessitated by the financial crisis, might have held back the sukuk market (although from the growth in new issuance, it has not had a dramatic effect).  It is good to see the problem acknowledged and first steps made to fix the problem, but it is just the beginning of the process since even when laws are enacted it will take a while for enough cases that use the bankruptcy process to create certainty for investors about what they can expect if the issuer of the sukuk they buy needs to use it.  

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More Information

Tuesday, December 11, 2012

Dana Gas restructures sukuk

Dana Gas released the final terms on its restructuring of the $1 billion sukuk that matured on October 31st, and they were within the terms expected.  The $1 billion sukuk (of which $80 million was bought back, and will be cancelled) had $70 million in cash paid to sukuk holders with the remainder split between a convertible and non-convertible sukuk, with an average coupon of 8%, due in 5 years.  This is not much higher than the 7.5% coupon the original sukuk had, but the conversion price which is not fixed as I understand it, but will come in at between Dh0.75 and 1.00 (the stock is currently trading in the low Dh0.40 range).

Using a back of the envelope calculation with a 20% discount rate, that amounts to about a 30% haircut in present value terms for sukuk holders (excluding the value of the conversion feature for the convertible tranche of the sukuk), which is probably a good deal for sukuk holders if the company can collect on its receivables from Egypt and Iraq (a small portion of which from the latter were received by Dana Gas shortly before the restructuring agreement was made public). 

Sukuk holders could have enforced the guarantee on the assets that were put up to secure the sukuk which amounted to the company's assets in Egypt (the company asserted that these gas concessions could be cancelled if sukuk holders enforced on the collateral) and a built but not yet operational natural gas import terminal and processing plant in Sharjah.  The latter asset was probably not of much value since it would be time consuming and costly to go through the UAE court system (not to mention not guaranteed to be successful) to take possession of the asset.  Not to mention that it has been entangled in a dispute with Iran's national oil company over the agreement to import gas .

There are likely other terms included in the final restructuring agreement that are not yet known, which may include rights (just speculating here) to Dana Gas' 3% interest in MOL, the Hungarian company with which it is operating its assets in Kurdistan, which were not a part of the collateral of the original sukuk (or perhaps a covenant that Dana Gas cannot sell that asset without using a portion of the proceeds to repay creditors).  But that is just a guess on my part and I don't have any information about whether it was included (if you know, please email me).

The bigger story here is that there is now precedent set for a restructuring of a UAE-based private sector sukuk.  That doesn't carry any weight in the local court system, but it might for future cases where a private sector corporate sukuk issuer runs into trouble.  There is now at least one situation that can be used as a point of reference. 

The legal environment in the UAE and the limitations on foreign ownership, not to mention the lack of a bankruptcy regime will continue to introduce uncertainty for creditors (even where the sukuk is subject to English law, since English law judgments are not enforceable in the UAE).  However, the bankruptcy law being developed has continued to face delays.  That is not necessarily problematic if the delays are done in a way that produces something something that is able to translate from law to practice.  One can only hope that the delays are due to a desire to 'get it right' and not just dragging of feet or bureaucratic intertia that favors the status quo. 

Thursday, August 30, 2012

Arcapita seeking $150MM - $200MM in Shari'ah-compliant DIP financing

For those readers who do not follow me on Twitter, here are a few tweets relating to the motion (PDF) filed by Arcapita requesting permission to pay $500,000 in expenses to an as-yet unnamed financing partner for $150MM - $200MM in Shari'ah-compliant debt financing, which Arcapita says is the first such debt (Shari'ah-compliant within a Chapter 11 bankruptcy). 


Monday, July 16, 2012

Whither Islamic finance dispute resolution?

The issue of how to resolve disputes in Islamic finance is complicated.  Currently, the most common way is to make most large Islamic finance products subject to English law (or more rarely New York law) to capitalize on those regions' long history in finance and strong legal systems.  The legal systems in many countries where Islamic finance is prevalent are not viewed as sufficiently predictable should a dispute, insolvency or restructuring happen.  I addressed the issue in my last newsletter (sign up on the right side of my blog) with respects to new laws being considered in the UAE to develop a new insolvency and restructuring regime that will be Shari'ah-compliant. 

The issue of Shari'ah-compliance particularly in insolvency and restructurings, but also in commercial dispute is important for Islamic finance.  When using English and New York law, the need for certainty outweighs Shari'ah considerations (and those can be considered, but only consensually; these courts will not consider Shari'ah in their decisions, nor should they be expected to being a part of secular legal systems).  However, for Islamic financial institutions, there will come a day when the consensual system of finding solutions that are Shari'ah-compliant will not be sufficient and there will be disputes that involve important issues of Islamic jurisprudence at the heart of the contracts, and a secular legal system will not be able to handle it. 

The UAE route of changing their laws to put in place a system that is both based on well established legal systems but also tailored to the needs of that country (including incorporating Shari'ah).  An alternative is being considered in Qatar through the Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre (QICDRC), which would operate within Qatar but with a more global focus.  Both systems would be a welcome change from the situation today where Shari'ah disputes that are part of conflicts between parties or are involved within insolvency and restructuring situations cannot be directly addressed.  It will undoubtedly be a long time before any new system through either the QICDRC or the new UAE laws will develop the credibility and predictability required to challenge London or New York as the legal homes for cross-border products, but to get to that point requires a first step, which the UAE and Qatar appear to be taking. 

Wednesday, June 20, 2012

UM Financial receivership may be nearing an end

During my time writing for The Islamic Globe, one of the stories where I directed a lot of attention was the receivership and bankruptcy of UM Financial, Inc. (and its sister company UM Capital, with the two companies referred to as "UM Financial" for the rest of this post), which offered Islamic mortgages to consumers in the Toronto, Ontario area, funded by the Credit Union Central Ontario, which was later merged with Credit Union Central British Columbia, to become Central 1 Credit Union.  

The trigger for the receivership was the decision by the funder, Central 1 Credit Union, to decline to offer additional funding to UM Financial and then requesting the receivership on the basis that UM Financial was in non-monetary default on its credit facility with Central 1.  However, the situation moved from typical problems in a messy business separation after a breakdown of the relationship to the bizarre, when Grant Thornton, the receiver discovered $2.1 million missing, having been withdrawn by the CEO of UM Financial, Omar Kalair, in gold and silver in the months before the receivership. 

The gold was purportedly in partial payment of an invoice drafted by Kalair and Mufti Yusuf Panchbaya, for Shari'ah advisory services provided by the board, headed by Mufti Panchbhaya since the inception of UM Financial.  The timing of the payments immediately before the receivership--when at least Kalair was aware was pending--raised red flags for Grant Thornton, based on statements in a number of court filings.  The transfer of the gold, according to Kalair's sworn testimony, occurred in a dark pharmacy parking lot, with $1.8 million and $300,000 in silver being transferred from Kalair's trunk to the trunk of Joseph Adam's car, a shopkeeper who ran an Islamic clothing and bookstore (Adam is also known as Gamal Hegazy).

Shortly after, Adam departed Toronto for his native Egypt with the gold, having returned the silver to Kalair who then gave it to Panchbhaya, who later turned it over to the receiver (it was then sold with a $90,000 loss due to the fall in silver prices).  There is considerable confusion on who the gold was intended to be paid to, the local Shari'ah board, Adam, or other consultants who worked with the domestic Shari'ah board.  The final story given was that it was paid to unnamed Egyptian scholars who had issued a fatwa for UM Financial, who were introduced through a relative of Adam's, though the only evidence is a one page document with a number of unidentified signatures.  Adam admitted in a deposition via Skype that he had taken the gold bars in his suitcase to Egypt, and distributed them, but would not reveal to whom he gave the bars.  The gold has still not been located.


During the entire process, many of the homeowners who received financing were left in limbo as the receiver sorted through the paperwork, uncovering second mortgages along the way that increased the confusion about how much had been paid on each property.  From the initial 172 clients, a number of mortgages were discharged after being refinanced and 20 were discharged after the customers demonstrated that they had paid UM Financial the remaining balance, which was then not passed along to Central 1. 

In the process, the receiver was collecting fees according to the "Musharaka Home Financing Agreement", which included annual 'renewal' fees and prepayment fees of profit for the full year in which the refinance occurred.  The receiver has decided to keep the annual fees, but rebate the prepayment penalties on a pro rata basis (based on when the refinance took place), and has asked for court approval to do so. It has also asked for approval to sell the portfolio to Central 1, after bids for the portfolio received during a sales process were rejected because they offered a price that was at a discount to the amount owed by UM Financial to Central 1. 

The sale is being done through a credit bid, where Central 1 is bidding the amount it is owed by UM Financial, in exchange for the debt being extinguished, in effect, receiving the portfolio in lieu of any payment by UM Financial.  The purchase and sale agreements were signed on June 15th and the court will consider the offer on June 29th, which will likely end the UM Financial saga, although the homeowners affected (through the first and second mortgages) will continue to be impacted, just with a new servicer on the first mortgages, Central 1. 

Kalair, Adam and Panchbhaya, according to court filings, face a continuing investigation.  Adam told the lawyer for Grant Thornton that he had spent several weeks in the hospital due to stress and the flu.  He is seeking a way to return to Canada for medical treatment, but will be arrested and jailed for 6 month for contempt of court unless he can provide the receiver with a return of the gold bars and answer the receiver's questions. 

The fate of Kalair and Panchbhaya are murkier still since Grant Thornton reported an ongoing investigation by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police into alleged Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and Criminal Code offenses, relating to the receivership and bankruptcy of UM Financial.  The investigation also includes allegations of offenses relating to the transfer of gold, which brings the Multicultural Consultancy Canada Ltd, a company formed by Panchbhaya to receive the gold, into the picture.  Among the alleged offenses are fraudulent disposition, bankruptcy fraud and conspiracy to defraud creditors, according to a production order served on Grant Thornton as receiver of the 2 UM Financial companies. The investigation does not mention Kalair or Panchbhaya by name, but they are likely to be included in the target of the investigation, "the Debtors [UM Financial Inc and UM Capital Inc] and the operating minds behind the Debtors and MCC". 

Whatever the eventual fate of the parties involved with UM Financial, it serves as a reminder that even in Islamic finance, there can be breakdowns of trust between businesses and between a company and its customer and the fact that a business represents itself as being 'Islamic' does not mean that everyone involved will act ethically. 

There are specific examples in the UM Financial saga where the management of a company may not be fully independent of its Shari'ah board, which dulls the effectiveness of the Shari'ah board as an independent check for investors and customers.  There were also instances where too much control over the handling of money occurs without oversight by either customers, creditors, internal personnel besides management and regulators (UM Financial was unregulated). 

At the end of the day, the worst part of the UM Financial saga is that it harmed homeowners, and will limit trust in Islamic financial institutions in Canada, likely for many years to come.  It should remain as a lesson for the industry as a whole to remain vigilant to protect the entire industry's reputation, which is much easier lost than it is rebuilt. 

Related Documents:
Latest court filing (PDF)
List of all court filings released by Grant Thornton, the Receiver

Tuesday, June 12, 2012

Lessons from Arcapita

When I was writing for The Islamic Globe, I covered Arcapita and in particular the financial difficulties around its J. Jill portfolio company as that company saw the debt used for the acquisition downgraded several times.  It led me to look more deeply into the financial statements of Arcapita and recognize a problem with the upcoming maturity of a $1.1 billion murabaha due in March 2012.

J. Jill was instructive because it was, I believe, the only new investment made by Arcapita after the financial crisis and the speed at which it soured (in terms of credit downgrades) was surprising.  At the time, I thought that it might have been a problem of Arcapita not realizing the "new normal" where lenders were much tighter in offering debt financing (the downgrades were due to J. Jill running up against debt covenants, which were likely to be breached since they became more constrictive in future years). 

Unfortunately, the Islamic Globe suspended publication and Arcapita filed for bankruptcy (meaning the most current financial statements were from September 2011) before I could finish an article about the firm's problems.  Since the bankruptcy, I have followed intensely the filings with the bankruptcy court and have been puzzled that the company did not request permission from the court to sell profine GmbH, which it sold to a German private equity company in late April 2012, more than a month after the bankruptcy filing.  The lack of court filings was hard to understand since the profine press release announcing the sale said: "profine GmbH, one of the world’s leading manufacturers of PVC-U profiles for windows and doors, has a new owner. The Frankfurt company Hidden Peak Capital has bought up the shares of the former owner, Arcapita Bank BSC of Bahrain."

There was a good deal of activity in the bankruptcy court concerning a debt guarantee provided by Arcapita to Commerzbank, who provided the financing for the acquisition, but nothing about the sale of the company.  I went back then to the original 'first day' filings, and found the story laid out clearly, but must have glossed over on first reading.  They detail troubles at profine much earlier, as early as May 2008 (seven months after Arcapita acquired the company). 

To be fair, this was months after the failure of Bear Stearns and the credit crisis was just in its early stage, but it matches up quite well with the few details I have about J. Jill, which was acquired after the credit crisis, but with the same leveraged buy-out mentality of Arcapita.  In May 2008, Arcapita sunk an additional 25 million euro in equity into profine, and provided Commerzbank with a 125 million euro guarantee, tied to profine's financial performance, which worsened in the financial crisis. 

Beginning in 2009, Arcapita and Commerzbank worked on a subsequent financial restructuring of profine, which they finally closed in November 2010 requiring an additional 45 million euro in equity capital by the end of 2011.  When that date neared, Arcapita was in dire straights trying to raise the capital to repay the murabaha (the failure to do so earlier was ascribed by Arcapita to the European debt crisis in 2011).  They negotiated a one month extension to put up the remaining 13 million euro in equity, but at the end of January, they decided to withhold the funds (whether due to the financial situation of profine or due to their own lack of cash I don't know). 

As a result of their decision, their board members were sacked and Commerzbank accelerated the debt due by profine to Commerzbank.  As a result of Arcapita's bankruptcy, which was attributed to distressed debt buyers of their $1.1 billion murabaha taking a hard line, Commerzbank now has to wait for the bankruptcy court to approve a restructuring plan in order for them to make good on Arcapita's guarantee of profine's debt.  An educated guess suggests that Arcapita's financial guarantee was secured by Arcapita's equity interest in profine, which was likely taken before the bankruptcy filing, and thus Arcapita did not need to request bankruptcy court approval for the sale of profine to Hidden Peak Capital. 

At the end of the day, both the J. Jill and profine acquisitions suggest that Arcapita was aggressive with the amount of leveraged used in taking over these companies, and whether that type of leverage is appropriate for an Islamic financial institution should be a topic for discussion in the industry.  There will always be some degree of leverage in financial institutions.  Islamic banks that issue sukuk are leveraging their equity investors' money also, but with fewer casualties during the financial crisis (Islamic investment banks have taken the brunt of the pain from forced deleveraging and a sharp drop in deal flow and therefore income throughout the financial crisis and its aftermath). 

Sunday, April 29, 2012

Arcapita's portfolio company profine sold to private equity firm Hidden Peak Capital

Arcapita's subsidiary profine GmbH, a German-based plastics window frame manufacturer was sold to Hidden Peak Capital, a special situations private equity group based in Germany.  The terms of the transactions were not disclosed, but it likely includes the repayment of the murabaha loan from Commerzbank for up to €125 million that is guaranteed by Arcapita (total borrowing amount is not disclosed in the court filings). 

The murabaha facility entered the court documents when Commerzbank requested permission from the bankruptcy court to serve notice on Arcapita that the facility was in default to perfect their claim on Arcapita, which they contended should be exempted from the automatic stay. 

While the sale, which may need approval from the bankruptcy court, resolves one issue in front of the court, it will likely heighten the challenges by creditors on Arcapita's ability to continue to make inter-company transfers.  Not all of Arcapita's subsidiaries were covered by the bankruptcy, so there is a possibility that proceeds from the sale could be moved into non-debtor subsidiaries, away from the reaches of creditors. 

Monday, April 23, 2012

Arcapita bankruptcy update

In the latest week's newsletter (sign up for the newsletter on the right side of the blog; an archive is available on my website), I included a summary of some of the latest developments in the Arcapita bankruptcy case[1].

Arcapita’s bankruptcy case is ongoing and a recent objection by Standard Chartered, which provided $100 million of murabaha financing to Arcapita in 2011, presumably to finance the company through its anticipated debt restructuring of the $1.1 billion murabaha whose imminent maturity led the company into bankruptcy. 

The objection by Standard Chartered is based on the potential, according to Standard Chartered, for Arcapita to make inter-company transfers of dividends that should be held for Standard Chartered due to its mortgage on the equity of a number of Arcapita subsidiaries.  Standard Chartered, in a court filing, described that “if the value of the Subsidiary Guarantors, which is at best uncertain, is transferred to AIHL [Arcapita’s Cayman Islands holding company] or Arcapita Bank, Standard Chartered’s security interests could be rendered worthless and the Subsidiary Guarantors could impermissibly be rendered insolvent to the detriment of Standard Chartered”. 

Standard Chartered is asking the court to make the approval of any budgets the court is presented with by Arcapita require approval by Standard Chartered as well.  More concerning for the unsecured murabaha holders, the senior position of Standard Chartered means Arcapita will have to come up with more money before lower priority murabaha creditors get paid. 

In another document filed with the bankruptcy court, Barclays Bank, which is on the committee of unsecured creditors, has asked the court permission for its affiliates to trade claims on Arcapita’s debt, as long as it separates those trading activities from its position as a committee member to avoid potential conflicts of interest. 

As I mentioned in an earlier blog post, is the fact that the murabaha financing is being traded (and the trading is unlikely to occur at par).  Yet, there has been much less controversy about this than about the potential for the Goldman sukuk to be traded since it was listed on the Irish Stock Exchange (even though it was never likely to trade).  
There are a few filings so far this week including two (pdf 1, pdf 2) requesting an extension of the time Arcapita has to file its financial statements to June 21, 2012, from the previously extended deadline of May 3, 2012.  In their filings, Arcapita cite a need to consider "nuanced legal issues[...], in particular, payments and distributions to and from insiders and other affiliates".  They also cite as a source of delay, "the Shari’ah-compliant nature of the Debtors’ investments requires a thorough analysis of some of the characterizations required by the Schedules and Statements"

Another filing, this one from Commerzbank (pdf), asks the court to grant a relief from the automatic stay to allow Commerzbank to serve a notice of default on profine GmbH, a portfolio company of Arcapita that manufactures PVC window frames, on a Euro125 million murabaha line of credit (guaranteed by Arcapita), which profine defaulted on a week before Arcapita filed for bankruptcy.  Under the murabaha (the total amount outstanding is not specified in the filing, but is described as "principal plus unpaid profit"), Commerzbank could only exercise the guarantee once 14 days passed after the default.  Commerzbank argues that delivering a claim notice to Arcapita is only a ministerial act designed to perfect and crystallize Commerzbank's claim, and therefore it would fall outside of the automatic stay.  It is unclear whether the default was related to funding problems at Arcapita, but profine announced a management change on February 24, weeks before defaulting on the murabaha (followed of course by Arcapita's bankruptcy filing). 

[1] Note: I am not a lawyer, so this post represents my opinion from reading the court filings.