One of the ideas of Islamic banking that is most often
repeated is that the Islamic banking system is based on profit-and-loss sharing
products. However, the theory and
practice diverge significantly on this at least on the asset side of the
balance sheet. The liability side (e.g.
deposits and equity) are done more along the lines of the theoretical model of
mudaraba. However, a recent working paper published by the IMF (pdf) found that the profit-and-loss
sharing of Islamic banks did not translate into a significant difference in the
profit rates paid on deposits.
The study examined Malaysia and Turkey from 1997 to 2010,
which included 2 crises (1997/98 for Malaysia, 2000/01 for Turkey, and 2008/09
for both). This should provide some
evidence that Islamic banks operate differently from conventional banks by not
focusing exclusively on a smoother period, or a crisis period. However, the results of the econometric tests
showed that the deposit rates on Islamic and conventional deposits moved
together and tests for causality showed a significant causality from conventional
deposit rates to Islamic deposit rates, but did not find evidence of causality
in the other direction. The data used in
the study were for 1-year deposits, although the authors indicate that tests
using 1-month and 3-month deposit rates gave similar results.
The authors of the study do not test to see why this
relationship exists, but they do hypothesize on a few possible
explanations. One is that Islamic banks
have to compete for deposits with conventional banks and therefore have to pay
depositors competitive returns on their money in order to attract
deposits. This is accomplished in most
Islamic banks by using Profit Equalization Reserve accounts that allow the bank
to save up excess profits to cover shortfalls from the market rate of deposit
interest/profits.
Another explanation is that the profitability of an Islamic
bank is determined, in large part, by the assets on its balance sheets. Given that the products used by most Islamic
banks are debt-based products like murabaha, ijara, and istisna’a, which generate
returns that are benchmarked to LIBOR or another conventional interest rate
benchmark, the profitability of the bank will be in large part based on
interest rate movements.
This explanation does make sense, but is less obvious an
explanation because, while deposit rates do move in line with other interest
rates, like LIBOR, there is not necessarily an automatic relationship between
one and the other. If the changes in
Islamic bank deposit rates were driven by changes in rates on assets (e.g.
LIBOR), the causality flowing from conventional bank deposit interest rates to Islamic bank deposit
profit rates would probably not be there.
Islamic banks as they work today should not have significant differences
in the breakdown of their assets compared with conventional banks, so the
transmission of changes in LIBOR to changes in deposit profit rates should not
occur with a lag compared with conventional banks (there should not be
causality from conventional rates to Islamic rates on deposits).
The evidence, at least from this one study looking at just
two countries, suggests that the more probable explanation is that Islamic
banks manage their deposit profit rates using Profit Equalization Reserve
accounts to follow conventional deposit interest rates. The reason for this is relatively simple: if
they offer lower rates, they will have trouble attracting deposits. Alternatively, if the rates are highly
variable, with some period where Islamic deposit account returns are
significantly higher than conventional deposit rates, but also periods of
significant underperformance, it will also discourage depositors from moving to
Islamic banks because depositors are not likely concerned with the average
deposit rate over a period of time alone, but want this return to be of lower
variability.
What are the lessons from this? First, Islamic banks are not independent of conventional banks and (based on the data in this study) compete directly with conventional banks. Second, Islamic banks do not operate based solely on the theoretical construct of profit-and-loss sharing, even on their liability side. As long as this relationship continues to hold--and there are valid consumer demands that Islamic banks must meet, and regulatory environments which make Islamic banks look like "banks"--the idea that Islamic banks are more resilient or even somehow unique in their response to economic changes should be dismissed. There may be areas where they could be, but even on the side of the balance sheet where profit-and-loss sharing is at least theoretically entrenched, the data shows a strong relationship between Islamic banks and their conventional competitors.
See the index of other posts: http://investhalal.blogspot.com/2011/11/islamic-finance-complexity.html
1 comment:
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